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ABSTRACT
SECURE MOBILE COMPUTING BY USING CONVOLUTIONAL AND CAPSULE
DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS
Rui Ning
Old Dominion University, 2020
Director: Dr. Hongyi Wu

Mobile devices are becoming smarter to satisfy modern user’s increasing needs better,
which is achieved by equipping divers of sensors and integrating the most cutting-edge Deep
Learning (DL) techniques. As a sophisticated system, it is often vulnerable to multiple
attacks (side-channel attacks, neural backdoor, etc.). This dissertation proposes solutions
to maintain the cyber-hygiene of the DL-Based smartphone system by exploring possible
vulnerabilities and developing countermeasures.
First, I actively explore possible vulnerabilities on the DL-Based smartphone system to
develop proactive defence mechanisms. I discover a new side-channel attack on smartphones
using the unrestricted magnetic sensor data. I demonstrate that attackers can effectively
infer the Apps being used on a smartphone with an accuracy of over 80%, through training a
deep Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). Various signal processing strategies have been
studied for feature extractions, including a tempogram based scheme. Moreover, by further
exploiting the unrestricted motion sensor to cluster magnetometer data, the sniffing accuracy
can increase to as high as 98%. To mitigate such attacks, I propose a noise injection scheme
that can effectively reduce the App sniffing accuracy to only 15% and, at the same time, has
a negligible effect on benign Apps.
On the other hand, I leverage the DL technique to build reactive malware detection
schemes. I propose an innovative approach, named CapJack, to detect in-browser malicious
cryptocurrency mining activities by using the latest CapsNet technology. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work to introduce CapsNet to the field of malware detection

through system-behavioural analysis. It is particularly useful to detect malicious miners
under multitasking environments where multiple applications run simultaneously.
Finally, as DL itself is vulnerable to model-based attacks, I proactively explore possible
attacks against the DL model. To this end, I discover a new clean label attack, named
Invisible Poison, which stealthily and aggressively plants a backdoor in neural networks
(NN). It converts a trigger to noise concealed inside regular images for training NN, to plant
a backdoor that can be later activated by the trigger. The attack has the following distinct
properties. First, it is a black-box attack, requiring zero-knowledge about the target NN
model. Second, it employs “invisible poison” to achieve stealthiness where the trigger is
disguised as “noise” that is therefore invisible to human, but at the same time, still remains
significant in the feature space and thus is highly effective to poison training data.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Mobile devices have become constant companions in our daily lives. People are not
just using their mobile devices at work and home – they are living on them. People rely
on smartphone applications (Apps) for communication, social networking, entertainment,
banking, shopping, navigation, healthcare, and more. For many people, every day begins
and ends with checking their smartphones. As more and more personal data are stored on
and processed and transmitted by smartphones, they are becoming an increasingly attractive
target for cybercriminals.
The modern mobile devices are becoming “smarter” to satisfy the increasing need of
users. Machine Learning techniques, Deep Learning (DL) specifically, have been adopted for
productivity and smarter decision making. They usually cooperate with a range of integrated
sensors, such as accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, GPS, gravity sensor, barometer,
microphone, ambient light sensor, and proximity sensor, to extract the knowledge of the
current state. As all are resulting in a sophisticated system, it is often vulnerable to multiple
attacks, including side-channel attacks (malicious use of on-device sensors), neural backdoor,
and data poisoning attacks, etc.
1.1 ATTACKS AGAINST DL-BASED SMARTPHONE SYSTEM
Side-channel Attack A range of work has attempted to construct side-channel attacks
to infer app usage on smartphones. Various methods have been leveraged, for instance,
power usage [1], system behaviour [2], and network traffic [3, 4]. In [1, 2], the authors
developed malicious Android Apps to collect system information, such as current, voltage,
network state, CPU and memory usage, from a victim. The collected data were analyzed,
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and machine learning techniques were used to identify the Apps on the victim’s device.
In [3,4], the authors designed learning systems to automatically fingerprint an App using the
encrypted network traffic (e.g., IP, protocol type, length, etc.). However, their approaches
require to either maliciously deploy an additional App [1, 2] or a traffic sniff device [3, 4]
to collect data on the victim’s device. It is also worth to mention that their approaches
perform poorly in scenarios that the Apps have minimal network traffic, or have random
system behaviour caused by multithreading.
In addition, Recent studies introduced several attacks due to the malicious use of magnetometer and motion sensors. For instance, a range of work [1, 5, 6] raised the idea of
cyber-vulnerability in 3D printing, where a piece of malicious software can infer the design
files by sniffing magnetometer. Furthermore, two recent works [7, 8] proposed utilizing motion sensors in smart devices to infer a user’s typed words or passwords. Similarly, Narain
et al. [9, 10] demonstrated that the accelerometer and the gyroscope could be used to infer
car driving routes and fingerprint devices.
Compared with traditional side-channel attacks, which usually require professional tools
to sample side-channel signals, the mobile side-channel signal sniffing can be conducted easily
by leveraging APIs provided by the operating system of mobile devices. In addition, since
the collected signal data can be transferred to the attacker in real-time through the Internet,
the adversary can perform the attack world-widely as long as they are online. However,
the challenging part of the mobile side-channel attack is how to efficiently extract useful
knowledge from the multi-modal signals from sensors with limited accuracy. To this end,
attackers reach out to find a more powerful, efficient, and adaptive tool for feature extraction.
DL-based Model Attack While deep learning is embraced as an important tool for efficiency and productivity, it is becoming an increasingly attractive target for cybercriminals.
For example, adversarial example (AE) [11–14] is one of the most widely studied attacks. It
adds small perturbation to a clean image to fool a target neural network (NN) to misclassify
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an image.
This attack usually requires full knowledge of the target NN model or abundant similarlydistributed training data to train a substitute NN. Moreover, an AE is narrowly targeted
at individual input samples. Previous studies [15, 16] have shown that a small change in
AE could render it ineffective. For instance, if an AE is interfered with by physical noises
introduced by a display, camera, or viewing angle change, it would fail to trigger the targeted
misclassification [15, 17].
Studies have shown a class of more robust attacks by planting a backdoor in NN models [18, 19]. The basic idea is to create a unique pattern and include it in training data. The
trained NN thus contains a backdoor. Whenever the trigger appears in the input image,
it activates the backdoor to misclassify the input to a category targeted by the attacker.
Compared with AE, the backdoor attack is more robust, especially under physical noises.
However, to plant a backdoor, the targeted model must be trained by the attacker using
manipulated training data and then offered to targeted users. This constraint makes the
attack less realistic.
The quest continues with the discovery of clean label attack [20, 21], which still targets
at creating a backdoor, but does not make the strong assumption that the targeted model
must be trained by the attacker. Instead, it aims to poison all or part of the training data
used by the victim in order to plant a backdoor. The key to success in such an attack is to
be stealthy, such that the victim cannot detect that the training data have been poisoned.
To this end, the training data can be constructed by using AE samples.
However, it inherits the limitations of AE as it requires either a white-box [20, 22] or a
substitute NN [21,23]. Another approach is to combine AE with a watermarked “trigger” [20]
to poison the images [23] to strive for a higher transferability over different NNs. In these
approaches, the triggers are, however, visible to human, and thus are likely to be discovered
by alerted users for image collection. Moreover, experiments show that it degrades the
performance of the targeted model.
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1.2 DISSERTATION CONTRIBUTIONS
In this dissertation, I have developed and demonstrated a systematical methodology of
discovering possible vulnerabilities and developing countermeasures on the DL-based smartphone system. Though it is not applicable for me to exhaust all the weaknesses and build
corresponding defence mechanisms. The methodology of the demonstrated examples in my
dissertation can still guide and motivate future researches in this field.
1. Proactively discovering side-channel vulnerabilities.
It is crucial to discover new side-channel vulnerabilities before it causes damages. To my
best knowledge, my work is the first that discovers and reports the correlation between
magnetometer readings and LED displays on smartphones. Based on this observation,
I demonstrate a newfound side-channel attack, where the attacker can sniff mobile
Apps through magnetometer data. In particular, I devise deep Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN) that can be trained to effectively infer the Apps installed on the
smartphone and their usage information. I implement the attack on iPhone 7 Plus and
Samsung Galaxy 7 and carry out extensive experiments, showing that the attack can
achieve an accuracy of 80-90% based on the magnetometer data.
Furthermore, I discover that the orientation data is closely correlated with the magnetometer readings. To this end, I use the orientation of the smartphone as an alternative
to train and test the CNN models. The performance is only slightly lower than the
original approach based on magnetometer data. This finding enables even more pervasive attacks since the orientation data can be readily obtained by integrating a 4-line
Javascript code in attacker’s websites, and the Javascript can continuously acquire the
orientation data even in the background. Besides showing this newfound side-channel
attack, I also discuss viable methods to mitigate it by injecting a minimal amount of
noise into the magnetometer or orientation data.
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2. Using deep learning technology to build side-channel defense mechanisms.
Deep learning has proven its success in computer vision, but it not trivial to directly
adopt it to our field. This is because the sensor data is spatial and contains rich
time-related information, while the digital image is continuous and time irrelevant.
Therefore, I am exploring possible methods to adopt cutting-edge deep learning techniques into the side-channel attack field seamlessly.
I propose an innovative approach to detect malicious cryptocurrency mining activities
by using the latest CapsNet technology. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
work to introduce CapsNet to the field of malware detection. It is particularly effective
to detect malicious miners under multitasking environments. Built upon the success of
the CapsNet-based approach, I further develop a two-layer classification system, named
CapJack, which can effectively transform a pre-trained model to detect miners on new
devices. This is intrinsically important to achieve practical usability, given the wide
variety of devices used by victims. The work delivers a well-engineered prototype. The
experiments reveal valuable empirical insights into the design space for miner detection
and the application of CapsNet for detecting malicious mining activities. Experimental
data show the appealing performance of CapJack, with a detection rate of as high as
87% instantly and 99% within a window of 11 seconds.
3. Exploring vulnerabilities of deep learning techniques. As the DL technology
plays as an essential role in my previous works, its robustness becomes crucial. Therefore, I reach out to explore the vulnerabilities of deep neural networks. I discover a new
clean label attack, named Invisible Poison, which stealthily and aggressively plants a
backdoor in neural networks (NN). It converts a trigger to noise concealed inside regular images for training NN, to plant a backdoor that can be later activated by the
trigger.
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1.3 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation is organized into the following chapters:
• Chapter 1: Introduction to the problem, existing works, and our approach’s contributions.
• Chapter 2: We discuss a new found side-channel attack against smartphones and its
countermeasures.
• Chapter 3: We discuss the methodology of introducing CapsNet to the field of malware
detection.
• Chapter 4: We shortly present our current work on discovering vulnerabilities of deep
neural networks and future works.
• Chapter 5: Conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2

DISCOVERING MOBILE SIDE-CHANNEL
VULNERABILITIES: SNIFFING MOBILE APPS IN
MAGNETIC FIELD THROUGH DEEP CONVOLUTIONAL
NEURAL NETWORKS (DEEPMAG)

This chapter reports a new side-channel attack on smartphones using the unrestricted
magnetic sensor data. We demonstrate that attackers can effectively infer the Apps being
used on a smartphone with an accuracy of over 80%, through training a deep Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNN). Various signal processing strategies have been studied for feature
extractions, including a tempogram based scheme. Moreover, by further exploiting the
unrestricted motion sensor to cluster magnetometer data, the sniffing accuracy can increase
to as high as 98%. To mitigate such attacks, we propose a noise injection scheme that can
effectively reduce the App sniffing accuracy to only 15% and at the same time has a negligible
effect on benign Apps.
2.1 PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS AND MOTIVATIONS
The quest begins with the observation of a subtle correlation between an LED display
and its surrounding magnetic field. For example, in our first experiment, we display a black
image on a 27 inch LED PC monitor for 20 seconds, followed by a white image for 60
seconds. We repeat the pattern for a number of rounds. In the meantime, an iPhone 7
Plus is placed in front of the monitor about 10cm away to measure the magnetic field. We
observe a noticeable change in the magnetic field while switching between the two images
(see Fig. 1(a)).
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Figure 1. Magnetometer readings on Y-axis. (a) Change of magnetometer reading due
to PC LED display, where the black and magenta waveforms correspond to the black and
white images, respectively. (b) Change of magnetic field due to smartphone LED display
(black and white). (c) Change of magnetic field while the smartphone sequentially displays
white-black-red-blue. The solid orange line in each dashed rectangle box represents the mean
of the signal within the box.
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The above phenomenon motivates us to further explore how the LED display on a smartphone would affect its magnetometer readings. To this end, we carry out a similar experiment
by displaying the black and white images on the iPhone 7 Plus while recording the data captured by the magnetometer on the same phone. Compared with the previous setting, we
expect more stable results since the distance between the LED display and the magnetometer is shorter and their relative orientation is fixed. The experimental data are depicted
in Fig. 1(b), demonstrating significant changes in magnetic field when different images are
displayed on the phone.
Fig. 1(c) further shows the change of magnetometer readings while the smartphone displays four different colors, white-black-red-blue, in sequence. While it is beyond our scope to
fully model this physical phenomenon, it is largely due to the fact that different bias voltages
are used when LED displays different colors, which accordingly lead to the change of the
magnetic field [24].
The results shown in Fig. 13 demonstrate the correlation between colors on LED display
and surrounding magnetic field. Since different Apps often adopt different graphic designs
that mix different color patterns, we speculate that they also induce different magnetometer
readings. In particular, when one clicks on an App’s icon, a unique welcome-page will be
displayed till the App is fully open. The corresponding changes in magnetic field can be
measured by the integrated magnetometer. Fig. 2 illustrates the averaged magnetometer
readings over the period for opening two popular Apps, i.e., Snapchat and Twitter, on
an iPhone 7 Plus. As can be seen, they differ dramatically on at least one axis (in this
case, Y-axis). This is because Snapchat adopts predominantly a bright yellow color while
Twitter uses blue. We have verified that the above observations are repeatable on different
smartphones and models. More results will be presented in Secs. 2.2-2.4. These preliminary
experimental data indicate that different Apps are likely associated with unique magnetic
signatures. Therefore, if one can acquire magnetometer data, he can potentially infer the
Apps running on a smartphone.
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(b) Magnetometer X-axis readings for Snapchat and Twitter.
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(c) Magnetometer Y-axis readings for Snapchat and Twitter.
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(d) Magnetometer Z-axis readings for Snapchat and Twitter.

Figure 2. Welcome pages and magnetometer readings of popular Apps.

2.2 MAGNETOMETER-BASED APP SNIFFING (MAS)
In this section, we present App sniffing solely based on the readings from magnetometer.
The preliminary observations presented in Sec. 3.1 indicate that different Apps are likely
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to induce different magnetic field. However, it remains a nontrivial problem to identify
the unique magnetic signature for each App and accordingly infer the Apps according to
magnetometer readings. The fundamental challenge lies in the facts that the magnetometer
data exhibit noise and randomness and that the Apps’ graphic designs often incorporate
complex combination of color patterns, rendering simple classification methods infeasible.
To this end, we propose to exploit the powerful deep CNN to classify magnetometer data
and to infer the corresponding Apps.

Input 3x36

CL1 3x34x64

CL1 3x32x64

pool 3x16x64

CL1 3x14x64

CL1 3x12x64

pool 3x6x64

Dense 128 Softmax

Convolution
64x1x3

Convolution
64x1x3

Maxpooling
[1 2]

Convolution
64x1x3

Convolution
64x1x3

Maxpooling
[1 2]

Output (7)

Figure 3. An example of the proposed deep CNN architectures.

2.2.1 DEEP CNN MODELS FOR MAGNETOMETER-BASED APP SNIFFING
Magnetometer data can be recorded when a user opens an App. In our preliminary
exploration, we have considered the seven most commonly used Apps, i.e., Twitter, Snapchat,
Pandora, Netflix, Google Maps, Chase Bank, and HBO. The recording process essentially
collects a sequence of magnetometer samples during the interval from clicking on an App to
the time when the welcome page of the App is fully displayed on the mobile screen. Fig. 2
shows the examples for opening Snapchat and Twitter, respectively. Different phones may
have different sampling rates of their magnetometers. For instance, Samsung Galaxy S7
and iPhone 7 Plus sample their magnetometers at the rate of 20Hz and 100Hz, respectively.
As to be shown later, the sampling rate has negligible impact on the effectiveness of App
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sniffing.
Since the change of magnetic field is relatively small, we preprocess the raw magnetometer
data by using a de-noising function (e.g., wden available in MATLAB [25]). It decomposes
the signal into wavelets and performs thresholding on wavelets coefficients.
We set the function at the denoise-level 5 with soft thresholding rule for the universal
p
threshold 2 ln (·). Then, we normalize the de-noised data by subtracting its mean and
dividing it by its vector’s norm. Figs. 2(b)-(d) illustrate the normalized magnetometer
readings of Snapchat and Twitter on X, Y, and Z axis. While the figure only shows about
4 seconds, the total recording time is 8.25 seconds including some overhead before and after
the App is opened.
Thus on an iPhone with a sampling rate of 100Hz, each magnetometer data would have
a dimension of 825 × 3. Directly feeding such high dimensional data into the CNN yields
poor results (less than 50% accuracy) because drastic changes over such a large span of 825
sample points may easily overwhelm a neural net’s representational capability. To this end,
we adopt a sliding window approach with a window size of W sample points to slide over
the time series. Each pair of adjacent slices has an overlap of P sample points. For example,
assume W = 36 and P = 31. If we have 100 original data (each with a dimension of 825 × 3),
they will be converted to 15, 800 sliced data each with a dimension of 36 × 3. The sliced
data are labeled with corresponding Apps for training and testing as to be discussed next.
We have explored several deep CNN architectures to sniff Apps based on magnetometer
data. In contrast to computer vision (that adopts 2D filters for images), the magnetometer
data on smart phone involves 3 channels (x, y, z) and data points along each channel dimension is a 1D time series. To this end, 1D filter is adopted in the architectures to capture
temporal correlations on each channel. Similar approaches are also found in human activity
recognition [26, 27].
Our goal is to demonstrate that an appropriately designed CNN can effectively sniff
frequently used Apps on a mobile phone. The exploration begins with a 3-Layer architecture
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consisting of only one convolutional layer. Based on our observation, the variation of the
Magnetic signal caused by the LED correlation is relatively small. To extract such a minor
change, we select kernel size as 1 × 3. Each layer applies Rectified Linear Units (ReLUs) as
the activation functions (taking f (x) = max(0, x)). The features extracted by convolutional
layers are fed into a densely connected layer which connects to the output softmax function.
Although a single convolutional layer is fast for computation, low-level features captured
in the first layer may not generalize well on the entire dataset. To exploit the wealth of
data that an attacker can obtain, we have further investigated several deeper structures
by stacking more convolutional layers together and inserting max pooling layers to reduce
dimensionality. Fig. 3 illustrates an example of such deep CNN structures. For brevity, a
6-layer CNN is denoted as: Conv (64)-Conv (64)-Pool -Conv (64)-Conv (64)-Pool -Dense(128)Sfmax. A layer is counted if it has adjustable weighted connections. Each convolutional
layer has 64 filters and the densely connected layer has 128 neurons with ReLU activations.
Maxpooling layer reduces the input dimension by half. As more convolutional layers are
stacked up, the network will be able to extract high-level features and generalize on the
dataset.
To understand the effectiveness of this CNN approach and compare the accuracy of
different CNN architectures, we have carried out a set of preliminary experiments. We
have considered the top-7 most used Apps as discussed earlier (from Twitter to HBO), and
collected a total of 700 raw magnetometer recordings on a number of Samsung Galaxy S7
and iPhone 7 Plus units. They are the flagship smartphones of Samsung and Apple – two
companies that together have a total market share of 72.8% in the US [28]. The CNN
models have been implemented in Tensorflow [29] with batch sizes of 150 and 100 epochs.
For comparison, we have also implemented a baseline 3-layer neural network (NN) model that
has dense connections and a support vector machine (SVM) model using LibSVM [30]. All of
them are trained and tested on a PC with I7-4470 CPU and NVIDIA 1080Ti graphic card. As
discussed earlier, we adopt a sliding window approach to slice each recorded magnetometer
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data. The default parameters are W = 36 and P = 31.
The primary performance metric is the accuracy, i.e., the fraction of correctly recognized
Apps. We utilize 4-fold cross validation (CV) for performance evaluation, where we randomly
divide a dataset to 4 parts and use three parts for training and the remaining part for testing.
This process is repeated four times such that each part is used for testing once. We are also
interested in the running time. For a 6-layer CNN model, the training time for each epoch
is around 4 seconds, and it takes about 100 epochs to achieve converged result.

(a) Feature learned by Conv 1

(b) Feature learned by Conv 2

(c) Feature learned by Conv 3

(d) Feature learned by Conv 4

(e) Feature learned by Dense Layer
(f) Feature learned at Output Layer (Prediction)

Figure 4. Visualization of features learned by the deep CNN.

As shown in Table 1, the 6-Layer CNN has the highest accuracy. At the same time,
we also observe that the accuracy is not sensitive to different CNN architectures. All of
them perform significantly better than SVM and NN. Thus, an attacker can utilize any
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Table 1. Performance Comparison of Different CNN Models.
Machine Learning Model
SVM
SVM with Sliced Input Data
3-Layer NN
3-Layer NN with Sliced Input Data
3-Layer CNN with Sliced Input Data
5-Layer CNN with Sliced Input Data
6-Layer CNN with Sliced Input Data
7-Layer CNN with Sliced Input Data
8-Layer CNN with Sliced Input Data

Accuracy
39%
42%
43%
46%
82%
83%
83%
83%
83%

general-purpose CNN to construct the attack without the need to fine-tune the CNN model.
Fig. 4 visualizes the features learned on input signal captured by the 4 convolutional
layers, dense layer and finally the output layer. Each convolutional layer trains a number
of filters to match similar spatial patterns in the input signal in order to minimize the cost
function. Each learned feature is displayed as 3 × 36 (size of the signal input) and arranged
in a stitched 16 × 4 = 64 array for each layer. Here, 3 is the number of channels and 36
is the sliding window size. Since the features learned from the signals are rather flat, we
remove the margins between neighboring features for better visualization. From Fig. 4(a),
the highlighted features (boxed) show mosaic patterns that are activated from the raw input
signal. Subsequent layers are more abstract and such low-level, mosaic patterns start to
disappear from the 3rd layer. Although the high level features learned by the CNN are not
visually explainable at this point [31], they jointly represent unique identifications for each
class of Apps on the high level. The learned features from convolutional layers are fed into
the dense layer that classifies the outputs into 7 classes. The output layer is a generalization
of all the features learned by the network that average over the data points in each class.
This is consistent with the reasoning in [32]. In contrast, SVM and NN fail to effectively
identify different Apps. It may be due to the fact that the time series from different Apps
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are overlapped and these models lack the automatic feature learning capabilities.
We further compare the performances by tuning different hyperparameters. The experimental results (omitted here due to space limit) show that the model is not sensitive to the
batch size. The slice window with W = 36 and P = 31 always yields the highest accuracy.
We also observe that the errors are generally evenly distributed unless two Apps are very
similar in colors and patterns. As shown in Table 2, the confusion between HBO and Netflix is relatively high, i.e., most errors of Netflix are misclassified into HBO, and vice versa,
because their colors are both predominantly black. This is also reflected in Fig. 4(f), where
the 1st and 4th classes, which respectively correspond to HBO and Netflix, show similarities.

Table 2. Confusion Matrix (under 6-Layer CNN with Sliced Input).
HBO
Chase
Google Maps
Netflix
Pandora
Snapchat
Twitter

HBO
70.13%
3.78%
3.33%
16.56%
0.7%
3.14%
2.36%

Chase
1.71%
85.54%
2.1%
1.26%
3.52%
2.24%
3.63%

Google Maps
0.27%
3.26%
86.53%
3.64%
0.68%
1.17%
4.45%

Netflix
14.92%
1.09%
1.46%
72.79%
2.45%
2.94%
4.35%

Pandora
2.85%
1.12%
1.23%
1.48%
89.12%
2.86%
1.34%

Snapchat
1.34%
2.26%
1.34%
1%
1.19%
91.81%
1.06%

Twitter
1.41%
2.32%
1.43%
0.37%
3.02%
0.12%
91.33%

2.2.2 ORIENTATION-BASED APP SNIFFING
The previous subsection has shown a possible approach to sniff Apps on a mobile phone
based on magnetometer data. The accuracy is about 0.84. We will introduce enhanced
schemes which achieve a higher accuracy of close to 1 in the next section. But before that,
we would like to discuss how an attacker can obtain sensory data from a user’s smartphone.
By default, any App on a smartphone can access magnetometer without user permission.
So the most straightforward approach is to embed a small piece of code in an benign App
to report magnetometer data to the attacker. However, not all mobile users would install
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such App. Toward this end, we have further considered a web-based method, where the
attackers can acquire sensor data by simply integrating a small (4 line) Javascript code in
their webpage. When a smartphone browses the webpage, the Javascript can read a range
of sensory data such as gyroscope and accelerometer that we will use later. However, it can
not attain direct access to the magnetometer of the mobile devices.
function d e v i c e O r i e n t a t i o n H a n d l e r ( eventData ) {
var ori_gamma = eventData . gamma ;
var ori_beta

= eventData . beta ;

var ori_alpha = eventData . alpha ;
}

Nevertheless, our investigation reveals that the orientation of the devices can be sniffed
using the web-based method. Furthermore, the orientation is closely correlated with the
magnetometer data as shown by comparing Fig. 1(c) and Fig. 5. As a matter of fact, the
primary use of magnetometer data on the smartphone is to calculate the device’s orientation
in conjunction with the accelerometer. Based on this interesting observation, we use the
orientation of the device as an alternative to train and test the CNN model. The performance (i.e., recognition accuracy) is only slightly lower than the original approach based on
magnetometer data. Details results will be discussed in Sec. 2.4 (see Table 5 and related
discussions).
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Figure 5. Change of orientation data while the smartphone sequentially displays four
different colors, white-black-red-blue.

2.2.3 MAS IN TIME-FREQUENCY REPRESENTATION
In the above discussion, we have demonstrated a side channel attack, i.e., MAS, where
the magnetometer data on a smartphone are exploitd by the attacker to infer the Apps
opened by the mobile user. The attack is implemented by using magnetic sigals in time
domain, achiving an accuracy of about 84%. Next, we further demonstrate the exploitation
of frequency domain signals that can potentially lanuch a more effective attack.
The frequency domain has been widely utlized in modern signal processing. In our case,
since the magnetic signal varies along the time domain, we need to consider the time and
frequency domain simultaneously, natureally leading to the use of spectrogram – a graph
of the spectrum of frequencies of a signal as they vary with time. The spectrogram is an
accurate representation of audio signal since human hearing is based on real-time spectrogram
encoded by ear. It has been extensively utilized in audio signal processing [33, 34]. Fig. 6
shows two examples of the spectrogram graph of the magnetic sensor readings while openning
HBO and Google Maps, respectively.
A naive approach is to directly replace the time domain signals by spectrogram, and
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(b) Spectrogram of Google Maps.

Figure 6. Examples of Spectrogram.

then train CNN models based on the input of spectrogram of magnetic sensor readings. The
testing results are shows in Table 3. The performance of the CNN models with spectrogram
input is slightly higher than the CNN models with raw magnetic time domain signals (see
Table 9), but significant lower than the MAS with slicing, which is around 84%. The poor
performance is not unexpected, because the frequency of the magnetic sensor reading ranges
widely from 2 to 10 Hz, leaving the majority area of the spectrogram graph blank. Therefore,
the differences between spectrogram graphs are largely concentrated in a very small area
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which leads to confusion and misclassification of the CNN model. We have conducted a
similar experiment by limiting the maximum frequency to 10Hz, in particular, to filter out
the un-needed frequencies. However, the subtle change of the magnetic sensor cause by
LED display still cannot be efficiently captured by the spectrogram which leads to nondifferentiable images. To this end, we have explored an alternative approach based on
Tempogram.
Tempogram [35] is initially developed as a state distribution graph for music signals. It
was originally designed to extract local tempo and beat information from audio recordings.
In our case, since the subtle change of the magnetic signal caused by the LED screen is similar
to the beats in audio signal, we expect the tempogram graph of the original magnetic signal
can better extract the features of the magnetic signal’s subtle changes. Fig. 7 shows the
raw magnetic sensor data and its corresponding tempogram graph. Specifically, we convert
a 1-D sensor reading to a 2-D graph with patterns which is easier for CNN to recognize.
Since CNN has proven success in image recognition, we expect this will lead to improved
performance.
Similar to the earlier discussions, a deep CNN is devised and trained by using the tempogram graphs as inputs. We have conducted a series of experiments. As shown in Table. 3,
the recognition accuracy of CNN using tempogram is improved to 90% which is dramatically higher than the raw magnetic data and spectrogram. It is also higher than the slicing
approach which is 84% (see Table 9). In the meantime, it decreases the size of training
dataset by 90% in comparison with the slicing approach, and accordingly reduce the total
computation time significantly.
2.3 MOTION SENSOR-ASSISTED MAS WITH TEMPOGRAM
In the previous section, we have demonstrated a side channel attack, i.e., MAS, where
the attacker sniffs the magnetometer data on a smartphone and accordingly infers the Apps
opened by the mobile user. The accuracy of such inference can be 90%. In this section, we
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Figure 7. Magnetic reading and tempogram.
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Table 3. Performance Comparison of Different CNN Models with Tempogram.
Machine Learning Model
3-Layer CNN
5-Layer CNN
3-Layer CNN with Spectrogram
5-Layer CNN with Spectrogram
3-Layer CNN with Tempogram
5-Layer CNN with Tempogram
6-Layer CNN with Tempogram
7-Layer CNN with Tempogram
8-Layer CNN with Tempogram

Accuracy
47%
48%
51%
51%
87%
87%
90%
89%
90%

show that the attack can be worse, i.e., the attacker can achieve even higher accuracy, if he
exploits motion sensor data.
Briefly, on a given smartphone, the locations of the Apps are generally fixed during the
time window when the attacker sniff sensor data (e.g., ranging from a few hours to a few
days). Suppose the mobile user clicked on Chase App 20 times during the period. If the 20
magnetometer or orientation data are fed into the CNN model introduced in Sec. 2.2, about
four of them would be classified incorrectly to some other Apps. However, if the attacker is
able to recognize that the 20 clicks are all at the same location on the screen, then he can
put them into a cluster and feed the cluster of magnetometer data to the CNN model. The
vast majority of them (90% in average) should be recognized correctly as Chase. Since the
cluster of clicks are from the same location, they should be the same App.1 Therefore, the
attacker can conclude that all 20 clicks are Chase. This approach is effective because, as to
be shown next, such clustering can be achieved with high accuracy (nearly 100%) by using
motion sensor data on the phone.

1

We have assumed that the most frequently used Apps are on the home page. The scenarios with multiple
pages and groups will be investigated in our future research.
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Figure 8. Comparison of gyroscope data on X, Y, and Z axis while clicking on top-left and
bottom-left of the screen.

2.3.1 CLUSTERING BASED ON MOTION SENSOR DATA
Nowadays, most mobile operating systems place their App icons in a fixed grid layout. For
instance, iPhone 7 plus has a 4x7 layout and Samsung S7 uses a 4x5 grid. When a user clicks
on different spots on the touch screen, the smartphone has a small rotation and/or vibration
that can be captured by the 3-axis gyroscope and accelerometer. Similar to the discussion on
magnetometer, different phones sample their motion sensors at different frequencies: 100 Hz
on iPhone and 50 Hz on Samsung Galaxy. Fig. 8 illustrates the 3-axis gyroscope data while
clicking on the top-left and bottom-left on an iPhone’s screen. As can be seen, the gyroscope
waveforms differ on all three axes, especially the X and Z axes. Several previous studies have
shown the use of motion sensors to infer the touches on a smartphone screen [36].
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Figure 9. The overall procedure of the motion sensor-assisted MAS.
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The attacker can build a training data set for each popular smartphone model and feed
the training data to CNN to create a motion classifier for this type of smartphone. Note
that, we cannot mix the training data of iPhone and Samsung phone since their layout are
different. Again, various CNN architectures and hyperparameters are explored, and finally
we adopt a 4-layer CNN model with the following setting in our experiments: Conv (64)Conv (64)-Pool -Dense(128)-Dropput(0.5)-Sfmax.
As discussed earlier, motion sensor (including accelerometer and gyroscope) data are
freely accessible by Apps or web-embedded Javascript. For training purpose, the attacker
can easily experiment on different phones to build training data sets. For example, given
a type of phone, the attacker can click on every grid points for a number of times, collect
motion sensor data, and label each data with the corresponding grid point. The 3-axis
gyroscope data and accelerometer data are combined together. A click lasts about 1 second.
So, each data has a dimension of 6 × 100 on iPhone since its sampling rate is 100 Hz, or
6 × 50 on Samsung S7 that samples at 50 per second.
The CNN models are trained offline. Once they are ready, the attacker can acquire
motion sensor data from mobile users either via Apps installed on the users’ phones or when
the mobile users browse the attacker’s websites embedded with his Javascript as we discussed
earlier. The data from each user are fed into the selected CNN model that matches the user’s
phone. If the type of phone is unknown, the attacker can always try different CNN models
and choose the one that yields the most reasonable result. Thus, the attacker can label each
click with a grid position on the screen, and accordingly group all clicks with the same label
into a cluster.
For example, in our preliminary experiment, we have collected gyroscope and accelerometer data when clicking 100 times on each spot of an iPhone 7 Plus’s screen. The experiments
have been repeated by two people using both right and left hands. In total, dataset contains
2 × 2 × 100 × 4 × 7 = 11200 data samples and each data sample has a dimension of 6 × 100.
Again, 4-fold cross validation is adopted.
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Table 4. Performances of clustering based on Motion Sensors.
No. of Grids
Accuracy

4
100%

8
100%

12
99%

16
99%

20
98%

24
98%

28
98%

Table 4 shows the clustering results. When we only consider four possible positions (at
the four corners of the screen), the accuracy is perfectly 1.0. With the increase of grid points,
the accuracy decreases slightly but is still maintained stable around 98%. With such high
accuracy, the attacker can effectively group the clicks into clusters and consider all clicks in
the same cluster to be associated with the same App.
2.3.2 MOTION SENSOR-ENHANCED ATTACK
Based on the above findings, we now combine the clustering scheme (enabled by motion
sensors) and the App classification based on magnetometer or orientation data. The overall
procedure of the motion sensor-assisted MAS is illustrated in Fig. 9.
Assume that a smartphone has visited the attacker’s website embedded with the aforementioned Javascript. Since the Javascript has free access to accelerometer, gyroscope and
orientation, the attacker can continuously eavesdrop such sensor data. Note that, even the
webpage is in the background, the Javascript can still acquire data. Of course, the attacker
can also try to camouflage codes in seemingly benign Apps, given the behavior of accessing
the sensor data is fairly common.
The hacker continuously collects sensor data for a desired period (usually for several hours
or days), and then performs a straightforward preprocessing to identify the clicks on the
screen and format corresponding motion data and tempogram of magnetic (or orientation)
data as follows:
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Each row represents one data comprising a click ID, corresponding motion sensor recording, magnetic or orientation recording, and other information such as the time stamp. The
attacker first uses the 4-layer motion CNN model to classify each click (i.e., each row of the
dataset) into a cluster and label it with the corresponding grid ID. The maximum number
of clusters equals to the number of grids on the mobile screen. Note that, all clicks in the
same cluster are from the same grid location and thus should be the same App. As shown
in Table 4, this step is very accurate.
Next, the attacker feeds a cluster of tempogram of magnetic (or orientation) data with
the same grid ID to the 6-layer tempogram-magnetic CNN model. Over 80% of them are
expected to be classified correctly, according to the accuracy presented in Table I. Because
they all belong to the same App, a majority vote can effectively determine the App for the
entire cluster.
As a result, the attacker can infer what Apps have been installed on the user’s mobile
device, how frequently they are used, and when they are opened. In other words, the attacker
can track the users’ habits of App usage. The attack can become even worse. For example, if
the attacker has identified a bank App, it is not too hard to capture the motion sensors while
the user types username and password. If the keyboard is static, the attacker can obtain the
password by using a similar approach as discussed above and access the bank account.
2.4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have used iPhone 7 Plus and Samsung Galaxy 7 to implement and demonstrate the
attacks. In this section, we present our experiments and results.
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2.4.1 SYSTEM SETUP
To collect motion sensor training data, we have considered iPhone 7 Plus and Samsung
S7 separately, since they have different App layouts: 4 × 7 and 4 × 5. For each grid point
in a layout, we have collected 400 samples. The corresponding dataset size for each model
is 400 × 4 × 7 and 400 × 4 × 5.
To recognize Apps, we have considered both magnetometer and orientation data. As
discussed before, the latter is desired because it can be accessed by Javascript embedded
in the attacker’s website. To create the training dataset, we have considered top 15 most
used Apps. We open each App 100 times and record the corresponding magnetometer and
orientation data.
All CNN models are implemented in Tensorflow [29]. The training is done offline and
the training data can be easily obtained by the attacker himself. On the other hand, it is
trickier to collect sensor data of the victims. To this end, we have developed a mobile webpage embedded with a sensor data collection Javascript (for gyroscope, accelerometer, and
orientation data) and a sensor data collection App on both iOS and Android (for gyroscope,
accelerometer, and magnetometer data). We run the experiment for one day to collect data
from users. Some clicks are to open Apps while others happen in the Apps. We differentiate
them by detecting the pressing of the home button on iPhone or Samsung phones. We only
process the sensor data of the clicks after pressing home button. Note that the attacker is
not necessary to process all clicks. As long as he can collect enough number of useful sensor
data, he can achieve his goal of sniffing users’ Apps and tracking their usage.
We have shown some initial experimental results in Sec. 2.2, assuming only magnetometer
data are sniffed to infer Apps. More results are presented here by considering different number of Apps and different MAS approaches. In the following discussion, “Magnetic Model”
denotes the baseline method where only the tempogram of magnetometer data are used
for training and testing; likewise, “Orientation Model” means the tempogram of orientation
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data are used for training and testing; “+ Motion” indicates motion sensor data are also
employed by following the procedure presented in Fig. 9.
We have also experimented on various devices. “Single Device” denotes the experimental
setting where training and testing are carried out based on the data from a single device;
“Cross Device” indicates the experiments conducted in a way that training is based on the
data from a device, while testing is on a different device but of the same type (e.g., both
devices are iPhone 7 Plus or both are Samsung Galaxy 7); “Cross Model” shows the results
where training is based on the data from a device, but testing is on a different device of the
different type; finally, “Cross Model Mix” means the setting where we mix data from different
devices in different models for both training and testing. Note that, the sensors’ sampling
rates on iPhone 7 Plus and Samsung Galaxy 7 are different. So, under “Cross Model Mix”,
the training and testing datasets include data sampled at different rates. “+Downsampling”
and “+Upsampling” are the signal processing schemes to decrease the sampling rate on
iPhone 7 Plus or increase the sampling rate of Samsung Galaxy 7 to keep them consistent.
2.4.2 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
As can be seen in Table 5, the accuracy generally decreases when more Apps are considered. When there are more Apps, their feature distances become shorter, thus resulting in
higher errors in CNN classification. For a given number of Apps, the accuracy is the lowest
under “Magnetic Model (Cross Model)”. This is because different smartphone models (especially different manufacturers) often use different types of magnetometers. Therefore, if we
train the CNNs based on data from iPhone 7 Plus, but test them on Samsung Galaxy 7, the
performance is naturally low. However, if training and testing are both based on mixed data
from different device models, the performance degradation becomes negligible (see “Magnetic
Model (Cross Model Mix)”). It is straightforward for an attacker to collect data from various
popular phones for training purpose. In addition, “Upsampling” and “Downsampling” do
not significantly improve the performance. The CNN model is not sensitive to the variance
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Figure 10. (a) Noised vs. original magnetic data. (b) E-compass data based on noised
and original magnetometer, where the noise is at the level of 8 µT. The resulting error of
e-compass reading is only 0.2° in average. (c) MAS accuracy under different noise amplitude.

of sampling rate.
Comparing “Magnetic Model (Cross Model Mix)” and “Orientation Model (Cross Model
Mix)”, the latter’s accuracy is only lower than the former by 4−6%. As discussed in Sec. 2.2,
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Table 5. Performance Comparison of MAS Approaches.
Number of Apps
Magnetic Model (Single Device)
Magnetic Model (Cross Device)
Magnetic Model (Cross Model)
Magnetic Model (Cross Model Mix)
Magnetic Model (Cross Model Mix) + Downsampling
Magnetic Model (Cross Model Mix) + Upsampling
Orientation Model (Cross Model Mix)
Magnetic Model (Cross Model Mix) + Motion
Orientation Model (Cross Model Mix) + Motion

3
93%
91%
72%
91%
91%
91%
84%
99%
98%

7
90%
87%
68%
87%
87%
88%
80%
98%
98%

11
86%
84%
62%
84%
84%
83%
79%
98%
98%

15
84%
82%
59%
81%
81%
81%
74%
97%
98%

orientation is highly correlated with magnetometer data. The use of orientation makes the
attack much easier, given that it can be obtained by a Javascript embedded in the attacker’s
webpage.
When motion sensor-assisted MAS is employed, the accuracy becomes as high as 98%,
and the difference between magnetometer and orientation data are fading away. This is
because the difference in their accuracy does not affect the majority vote.
In addition, large electronic devices, for example, refrigerators, may generate interference
on the magnetic field. To this end, we have carried out experiments when the smartphone is
placed at different distances to a refrigerator. As shown in Table 6, the impact is insignificant.
This is because the interference is a constant and thus cancelled out after normalization.
2.5 DEFENSE MECHANISM
In this section, we discuss viable methods to mitigate the MAS attack. The first approach
is to restrict the permission to access magnetic, orientation and motion sensors. With this
method, a system notification will be popped up when an APP or Javascript requests access
to those sensor data, alerting the users. Unfortunately, despite a potential threat, users may
still obliviously permit such access.
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Table 6. Accuracy under Magnetic Interferences.
Distance to Refrigerator (cm)
Magnetic Model (Cross Model Mix) + Motion
Orientation Model (Cross Model Mix) + Motion

25
97%
98%

50
97%
97%

100
98%
98%

A more transparent method is noise injection that perturbs magnetic sensor output. Since
the change of magnetic field caused by LED is relatively small, a minor Gaussian noises can
be introduced into the magnetometer or orientation data to mitigate the attack. An example
of such noise is illustrated in Fig. 10(a). It has minimum impact on normal applications. For
example, the e-compass uses magnetometer data to determine how many degrees the phone’s
front deviates from the true North. Its results based on noised and original magnetometer
signals are shown in Fig. 10(b), with the mean error of only 0.2°. For most applications,
such small errors do not substantially affect their functionality.
On the other hand, the noise will significantly affect the accuracy of MAS. For instance,
we generate a Gaussian noises at different levels (from 2 − 10 µT) and observe their impact
on MAS accuracy.
As shown in Figure. 10(c), the accuracy of the magnetic model drops to 15% when the
average amplitude of noise is 10 µT. Similarly the accuracy of orientation model degrades
significantly with the increase of noise level. Under the motion sensors-assisted MAS which
exploits motion sensor data for clustering, it is even more interesting to observe the sharp
accuracy decrease when the noise level exceeds 5 µT. In this case, the majority vote is likely
wrong, thus the entire cluster is classified incorrectly. One possible attack against our defense
mechanism is re-training in the presence of the noise. However, once the injected noise is
around the same level of the magnetic signal, re-training cannot learn useful information
from the output.
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2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY
We have observed the subtle correlation between an LED display and its surrounding
magnetic field. We have further demonstrated a new side-channel attack to smartphones by
exploiting this correlation, where the attacker can sniff mobile Apps by analyzing magnetometer or orientation data along with motion sensor data using deep learning techniques.
We have conducted extensive experiments on both iPhone 7 Plus and Samsung Galaxy 7 under different scenarios. Our experiments have demonstrated that the App sniffing accuracy
is as high as 98%. At last, we have proposed a noise injection scheme to effectively mitigate
such attacks.
2.6.1 DISCUSSION
Our approach achieves a 98% success rate when the users are stationary and can be widely
deployed to sniff millions of user by setting up and hijacking multiple websites. While users
are moving, the readings of magnetometer and motion sensors can vary drastically. As the
change of the magnetic field caused by LED is relatively small, the success rate of MAS
may be low under human movements. However, MAS is able to continuously sniff users
once it is set up. For frequently used Apps, we expect there are plenty of opportunities that
users would launch Apps both at moving and being stationary. As long as the users launch
the Apps while being stationary, MAS can accurately sniff the Apps. This is particularly
effective if an attacker wants to steal credentials such as online banking accounts. Certainly,
improving MAS’s performance under human movements is an interesting problem for future
direction. Several studies [26, 27] showed that sensor readings are closely correlated with
different human activities. For instance, stepping causes a repeatable pattern on motion
sensors and magnetometer readings. Hence, the attacker may detect human activity at first
and then tries to cancel out the drastic change caused by the human activity. This will be
one of our future directions.

33
Our approach delivers a relatively lower recognition rate on Apps with similar colors and
patterns. To address this problem, one possible solution is to extend the detection time
window to obtain more unique features from those Apps. Furthermore, since users tend to
behave uniquely (type, swipe, and pinch) in different Apps, the attacker may also leverage
motion sensor readings to enhance the recognition rate.
It is also worth mentioning that the nearby large electronic devices may interfere the
magnetometer reading. When users are stationary to the nearby devices, the interference
remains constant, which may be canceled out by the normalization of data preprocessing.
We will explore a better solution when users are moving around large electronic devices in
our future study.
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CHAPTER 3

BUILDING SIDE-CHANNEL DEFENSE MECHANISMS:
CAPTURE IN-BROWSER CRYPTO-JACKING BY DEEP
CAPSULE NETWORK THROUGH BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
(CAPJACK)

This chapter proposes an innovative approach, named CapJack, to detect in-browser
malicious cryptocurrency mining activities by using the latest CapsNet technology. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work to introduce CapsNet to the field of malware
detection through system behavioral analysis. It is particularly effective to detect malicious
miners under multitasking environments where multiple applications run simultaneously.
Experimental data show appealing performance of CapJack, with a detection rate of as high
as 87% instantly and 99% within a window of 11 seconds.
3.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS
Cryptocurrencies have gained global attention since 2017 due to the sharp surge in their
exchange prices. Amid a debate on whether it is a “tulip bubble” [37] or “future economy”
[38], the price of bitcoin peaked at $20,000 in Jan. 2018 [39], a stunning 20-fold increase
within 12 months. The fever also spreads to other alternative coins (i.e., altcoins). According
to [39], the market valuation of cryptocurrency hit 1 trillion USD in 2018. As a critical link
of the value chain, transactions rely on the underlying blockchain technology called mining.
It defines a series of processes to add transaction records to the public ledger, confirm
transactions in a trustful manner and reward the participants (called miners) some “tips”
for their efforts [40]. For example, bitcoin adopts the proof-of-work principle to ensure the
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information was difficult to make by solving a series of hash functions [40]. Due to the
high cost of hardware and maintenance, businesses have been investing in cloud mining to
concentrate hashpower (CPU/GPU/ASIC miners) and lease them through contracts [41].
As opposed to those centralized hashpower, if one could distribute the mining computation through hundreds of thousands devices (including datacenters, PCs, laptops, smartphones, and IoTs), it would be a lucrative business opportunity. As nefarious as it sounds,
cybercriminals also think along the same line to hijack the victims’ devices for mining via
crypto-malwares. Different from bitcoin, which requires GPU/ASIC for mining, many altcoins such as Monero can be mined effectively by CPU [39]. The growing number of devices
(both computers and embedded devices) connected to the Internet have been turned into
their preys. The damage would have significant financial impact on personal and business
infrastructure by causing system slowdown, reducing hardware lifespan and driving up the
electric bill. Due to the anonymous nature of cryptocurrency, these malicious activities are
difficult to trace. As demonstrated in Fig. 11, hackers can implant a segment of javascript
to use the victim’s device to mine cyrptocurrency without being noticed by the victim. Due
to their stealthy and immediately lucrative nature, mining malware had spiked by 629% in
the first quarter of 2018 as reported by McAfee [42].

,ĂĐŬĞƌͬŵĂůŝĐŝŽƵƐ WůĂŶƚŵŝŶŝŶŐ
ƐŝƚĞŽǁŶĞƌ
:ĂǀĂƐĐƌŝƉƚ

&ŝĂƚŵŽŶĞǇ

tĞďƐŝƚĞ

ǆƉůŽŝƚtĞďďƌŽǁƐĞƌƐ

ŶŽŶǇŵŽƵƐĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ

WhDŝŶŝŶŐ
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Figure 11. Procedure of crypto-jacking and profit chain.

Malware detection relies on the analysis of static signatures and dynamic behaviors [43].
Static analysis usually reverses the program to discover malicious pieces in the binaries such

36
as API calls, file manifest, domain name and permissions. To block cryptominers, browser
extensions like No Coin [44] and MinerBlock [45] use static method to detect mining scripts
and blacklist the malicious sites. However, as those signature scripts can be easily obfuscated
or changed, static analysis falls short to detect new/emerging patterns of crypto-malware.
Dynamic analysis monitors system behaviors such as network activities because malware
tends to use specialized procedures for communication. Since crypto-malware should intermittently connect to the mining pool, security analyst has been trying to find these network
signatures through protocols, packets, traffic intervals, domain names, etc. However, it is
challenging to differentiate the crypto-malware traffic among other types of communications
since the messages are short and the malware writers can adopt a variety of obfuscation
methods to blend them into normal traffic. Thus, it is rather difficult to create firewall rules
to block those miners.
Although scripts and network signatures alone can be obfuscated, mining malware cannot
escape from using a combination of computational and communication resources. To this
end, this research aims to develop effective solutions to detecting mining malware based on
system behaviors. We focus on a popular javascript offered by Coinhive [39], which mines a
cryptocurrency called Monero using CPU hashpower and can be implanted into any website.
Coinhive is the most prevalent malware online today, which holds the 1st place in Check
Point’s Top 10 Most Wanted Malware Index, with a global reach of 16 percent in April
2018 [39].
Our quest begins at a few naive approaches and ends with a highly efficient and accurate
scheme based on the latest Capsule Network technology. First, we perform basic static
and dynamic analysis to detect crypto mining using online virus/malicious scripts scanner
and abnormal resource utilization. However, it turns out that these methods have high
miss detection rate. Our exploration also leads to a more sophisticated mechanism based on
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [46], which is a state-of-the-art deep learning algorithm
to extract features from data. While it yields high detection rate for a single program, the
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performance deteriorates sharply when multiple programs are mixed – a scenario that is very
common in practice since users tend to multitask by launching different programs.
The observations and lessons learnt from the preliminary exploration motivate us to adopt
the latest Capsule Network (CapsNet). It is a machine learning system proposed recently by
Hinton et. al. [47] to more closely mimic biological neural organization. The design is motivated by the importance of preserving hierarchical pose relationships between object parts
in order to achieve correct classification and object recognition. To this end, CapsNet adds
structures called capsules to a convolutional neural network and employs dynamic routing to
connect capsules such that relative relationships between objects can be represented numerically as a pose matrix. Among other benefits, it can effectively recognize multiple objects
even if they overlap. As demonstrated in the seminal work [47], the overlapping digits (see
Fig. 12 for example) can now be recognized, which is unattainable by CNN.

(a)

(b)

Figure 12. CapsNet can effectively recognize overlapping digits. (a) 0 overlaps with 1;
CapsNet output: (0, 1). (b) 7 overlaps with 8; CapsNet output: (7, 8).

Thus, we extend the original architecture of Capsule Network to detect crypto-jacking in
a multi-task environment.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Sec. 3.2 summarizes the preliminary
explorations. Sec. 3.3 introduces the proposed scheme based on CapsNet. Sec. 3.4 presents
the experimental results. Finally, Sec. 3.5 concludes the chapter.
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Figure 13. (a) Miner hiding in browser processes. (b) CPU usage of three individual
applications: Game, Miner, and Video. (c) CPU usage of mixed applications.

3.2 PRELIMINARY

3.2.1 THREAT MODEL
Web browsers are vulnerable to malicious mining scripts and their presence is difficult
to detect. A hacker can create a mining instance within 10 lines of javascript with his
CoinHive site key. Like many third-party scripts, they perform tasks in the background
threads without user knowledge or permission by creating a Worker object. The hacker can
also define the number of CPU threads (number of cores on the victim’s machine) and throttle
(fraction of time that threads are idle), or set threads and throttle to a smaller number to
avoid detection of system slowdown. Even after the user close the browser, the attacker can
still launch a hidden window under the windows taskbar to continue mining. Miners rely
on WebSockets to open an interactive communication session between the user’s browser
and a server. The hacker could set up several WebSocket servers to connect their miners
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through the standard Stratum protocol [48] or even encrypted traffic with SSL support (from
Monero v9.7), that makes the network signature difficult to be detected. In this chapter, the
threat model assumes the hacker has all these capabilities to achieve stealthy and effective
crypto-jacking of the victim’s machine.
3.2.2 SYSTEM FEATURES
Feature selection is critical to malware behavioral analysis. Since in-browser mining
scripts do not attempt to inject malicious code or infect system files, it would be ineffective
to use traditional features such as API calls, DLL access, and file system registry activities.
Nevertheless, we discover mining is associated with a few essential features as outlined below.
• CPU Utilization. It indicates the sum of work handled by the CPU. Monero mining
uses AES-based hash called Cryptonight algorithm [49] that efficiently utilize CPU but
not GPU/FPGA/ASIC.
• Memory. It adopts a scratchpad with a size of the per-core L3 cache on CPUs. Therefore, the memory consumption is typically the number of threads times the L3 cache
(about 2 MB on Intel CPUs).
• Disk Read/Write. It may take intensive disk read/write during blockchain synchronization process, which happens periodically during the mining process.
• Network Interface. Monero uses the Stratum protocol to communicate with the server
for authorization, job submission, transactions, etc. The activities on the network
interface result in subtle patterns although they are usually not obvious to be observed
and recognized directly.
While more system-level features in a finer granularity could be collected, in this work, we
found that accurate detection of crypto-malware can be sufficiently achieved based on the
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combination of these high-level features that are easily accessible from task managers. This
also helps the detection process minimize the input dimension and system complexity.
3.2.3 FIRST ATTEMPT: TASK MANAGER AND MALWARE SCANNER
The first attempt is to use the task manager, hoping to find the miner among the list of
running processes. While it would be straightforward for a user to perform such detection,
the approach seldom succeeds because the miner hides among the browser processes. For
example, we conduct an experiment by building a custom website that integrates the CoinHive scripts. As shown in Fig. 13(a), the task manager does not unveil the existence of the
miner, whereas it is actually hiding in one of the 17 browser threads. It is rather difficult
to tell which one is the miner since the largest thread only utilizes 7.8% CPU, and at the
same time consumes less memory and network I/O than several other threads. Worse yet, on
mobile devices, as people tend to leave browsers open in background, more opportunties are
exploitable by attackers. Smart malware writers can even use the navigator class to monitor
the battery charging status to avoid draining the device battery.
The second attempt is to employ malware scanners. Most scanners on the market strive
to protect users from crypo-jacking malware by detecting the program’s signatures. Malware
scanners also develop their browser extensions to block in-browser mining scripts by monitoring network connections [44, 45]. We use VirusTotal [50], which exhaustively scans files
and webpages with almost all major antivirus engines and URL blacklisting services. When
we directly feed the CoinHive weblink to the scanners, merely 6 out of the total 68 scanners
can detect it. When we download the CoinHive Javascript and feed it to VirusTotal, the
detection rate is higher, where 17 scanners are able to detect the miner, as shown in Table
7. But the detection rate decreases quickly when we apply simple obfuscation mechanisms,
e.g., by using code obfuscation [51]. None of the scanners detect the miner after 2 times
of obfuscations. In fact, as Coinhive becomes “famous”, mining scripts are often specially
crafted or reimplemented with new service domain not on the blacklist. Once the source
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Table 7. Scanning Results of VirusTotal (Scanned on 07/28/2018).
Scanners
AegisLab
Comodo
Cyren
DrWeb
ESET-NOD32
GData
Jiangmin
Kaspersky
MAX
Microsoft
Qihoo-360
Rising
Sophos AV
Symantec
TrendMicro-HouseCall
ZoneAlarm
ViRobot

Raw
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit
Hit

1 × Obfuscated
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Hit
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Hit
Miss

2 × Obfuscated
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss

code is obfuscated, it would be extremely difficult for static malware scanners to detect it
since deobfuscation requires expertise from experienced security professionals.
3.2.4 A MORE SERIOUS APPROACH: CNN-BASED MINER DETECTION
As our first attempt using system tools and malware scanners are unsuccessful, we turn to
develop new detection techniques. When a miner runs on a device, it consumes computing
resources, which is obviously what the attackers want: using the computing resources on
victims’ devices for mining. To this end, we attempt to achieve effective miner detection by
observing and analyzing resource utilization features of CPU, memory, disk read/write and
network interface I/O.
For example, Fig. 13(b) shows the CPU utilization while running these applications
individually on a workstation with i5 CPU (4 cores) and 16 GB RAM. We can observe
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a noticeable difference between the three applications, in which the miner exhibits stable
resource utilization.
While the initial results look promising, further investigation soon dampens our enthusiasm. Discouraging results are observed when we mix those applications. People tend to
do multitasking nowadays and an operating system is built in such way to support different
processes. For instance, many people browse web pages or play games while listening to
music, or have the web browser running in the background while watching movie or editing
a document. It is common for a device to execute some applications (such as games and
videos) while the miner is also running. In fact hackers love to exploit these opportunities
since users tend to stay on them for long time. Fig. 13(c) illustrates the CPU utilization under three scenarios when two or more applications are running simultaneously. It is visually
difficult to single out which curve corresponds to the scenario with miner.
Will machine learning techniques help identify and recognize key features that are not
perceivable by human eye? Does it help by considering not only CPU but also other system
parameters? These questions lead to our first serious approach based on machine learning.
Previous research has considered to use machine learning techniques such as Naive Bayes and
Decision Trees [52]. As those non-parametric methods have limited discriminative power, we
adopt the state-of-the-art convolutional neural network (CNN) to recognize miners, as to be
outlined next.
CNN has demonstrated proven success in computer vision [46, 53]. Compared to traditional learning techniques based on hand-crafted features, CNN can be trained from end-toend to extract features automatically. Our goal is to train a CNN classifier to detect the
mining process based on the runtime system data. We use a performance monitor to gather
runtime system data. We choose 5 applications for the experiment including one Coinhive
miner and four common applications: music (Spotify), video (Local Video), game playing
(Human: Fall Flat), and web-browsing. We run each application individually and record
12 runtime system data (as summarized in Table.

8) for 30 minutes. The sampling rate
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Table 8. System resource utilization (where C1, C2, and C3 are three power save modes of
CPU).

Processor

Memory
Network
Disk

Processor Time
Interrupts/second
C1 Time
C2 Time
C3 Time
Page Reads/second
Page Write/second
Page Fault/second
Packets Reveived/second
Packets sent/second
Disk Reads/second
Disk Writes/second

is 1 Hz. Thus a dataset of 1800 × 12 is created for each application. CNN requires data
augmentation in order to “remember” patterns in the data distribution. To this end, we use
a slicing method [54] to slice the recorded data along the time dimension with a window size
of 5, yielding 360 samples per application.
Several CNN architectures are experimented. The classic VGG16 architecture repetitively
stacks 3 × 3 kernel blocks with max pooling layer. It has demonstrated proven success in
learning complex relations in data [55]. We develop similar network architectures by stacking
3 × 3 kernels followed by max pooling layer to better suit the runtime system data that
involves 12 channels and the data points on each channel is a 1D time series. The extracted
feature vector is fed into a dense classifier with a softmax loss function, which classifies the
applications. Due to the limits of data set, we do not use 16 layers to avoid overfitting;
instead, we implement several architectures with 1 or 2 convolutional layers, plus 1 dense
layer and 1 softmax layer.
The CNN models are trained in Tensorflow [29] with Nvidia 1080 Ti GPU. For comparison, we also implement a baseline 3-layer neural network with dense connections and
a support vector machine (SVM) using LibSVM [30]. The primary performance metric is
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the accuracy, i.e., the fraction of correctly recognized applications. We utilize 4-fold cross
validation for performance evaluation, where we randomly divide a dataset into 4 parts and
use three parts for training and one for testing. This process is repeated four times such
that each part is used for testing once.
As shown in Table 9 (under the column of “Single APP”), the test accuracy of the
CNN models (denoted as VGG-3 to VGG-5) can be as high as 0.98, when we consider
the applications that run individually only. However, as discussed earlier, users intend to
perform multitasking. To this end, we collect data of mixed applications in several common
combinations such as miner-web-music, web-music, and music-game with equal quantity.
The testing results based on the mixed applications are shown in the second column of
Table 9. As can be seen, the detection rate decreases dramatically to as low as 20%. At the
same time, the false positive rate is rather high, usually more than 20%. One possible reason
behind the poor performance is that the models are trained by the data of running individual
applications but tested under mixed applications. Given the two data distributions are not
homogeneous, the poor results are anticipated. Does it help to train the neural networks by
using data based on mixed applications? More specifically, we collect a number of samples
with mixed applications in various combinations and label them as including miner or not
including miner. However, the highest accuracy it can achieve is still low, i.e., 59% (see
Mix-trained CNN in the table).
3.2.5 LESSONS LEARNED
The above results show that the trained CNN models achieve high accuracy in singleapp detection but fail under mix-app scenarios. This can be visualized by a t-Distributed
Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) graph [56]. t-SNE is a technique for dimensionality
reduction that can be used for the visualization of high-dimensional datasets. We reshape
the collected samples by using t-SNE to map them from 5 × 12 to 2D. Fig. 14(a) illustrates
six classes in different colors. The first five classes correspond to individual applications,

45
Table 9. Comparison of accuracy for different models.
Model
SVM
DNN-3
VGG-3
VGG-4
Mix-trained CNN
KNN-MLL
CapsNet

Single APP
0.8123
0.8025
0.9518
0.9727
NA
NA
0.9531

Miner Detection
0.1977
0.2193
0.2319
0.2331
0.5933
0.3433
0.9895

False Positive
0.2033
0.2151
0.2466
0.2452
0.4017
0.2263
0.0103

while the last class, i.e., mix, represents the samples of mixed-applications: game-minervideo. Fig. 14(a) illustrates that the 5 single apps are generally classifiable since they were
mapped to different areas on the 2D space. However, the mixed-app samples are scattered
all over the space without a clear boundary. Similar to objects that are on top of each
other, mix-app can be considered as the merge of resource utilization of the processes1 .
In this perspective, it becomes clear that a machine learning model with the capability of
recognizing mixed/overlapped samples is essential to solve this complicated problem.
It is also worth pointing out the relevant work on K-Nearest Neighbor Multi-label Classifier (KNN-MLL), which obtains a multi-label vector for a testing data sample by performing
a frequency count on the multi-label vectors of its k nearest neighbors [57]. Neither CNN
or KNN-MLL is able to detect miner in the mix-app settings. CNN is a multi-classification
algorithm where its outputs are normalized by the soft-max function to make them sum
to unit. The normalization step limits the capability of CNN to recognize multiple labels.
KNN-MLL attempts to identify multi-labels for a testing sample purely based on information represented in the labels of its neighbors. This approach may be sufficient for some
applications, but it fails in our experiments (see the results in Table 9). The good news is
the latest development of CapsNet emerges to be a promising solution.
1

Note that we ignore the underlying optimization from the operating system as our results indicate these
factors have minimum impact.
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Figure 14. t-SNE visualization of CNN and CapsNet classification results. (a) t-SNE
visualization of CNN classification results. (b) t-SNE of CapsNet results on the original
device. (c) t-SNE of CapsNet results on the new device of a different model.

3.3 MINER DETECTION BASED ON CAPSNET
The observations and lessons learnt from the preliminary exploration motivate us to adopt
the latest Capsule Network (CapsNet) [47]. In contrast to CNN and KNN-MLL, CapsNet has
a different working mechanism. It first identifies whether the learned properties of each class
are presented in a given sample, and then uses lengths of the property vectors to represent
posterior probabilities for multiple classes. There is no constraint on those probabilities that
they must sum to unit. CapsNet intrinsically creates a new underlying mechanism to relate
spatial parts such that the neural operations are more robust, e.g., being invariant to image
rotation and able to identify overlapped digits (as illustrated in Fig. 12). In close analogy,
crypto miner along with other processes can be considered as mixed data distributions in
space.
In the context of malicious miner detection, each data sample can be regarded as a 12 × n
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sized image, where n is the number of sampled points. Accordingly, a scenario with mixed
applications can be treated as an “image” with overlapping objects. Therefore, it is sensible
to anticipate that a properly designed CapsNet would improve the miner detection rate,
especially in the settings where the miner is mixed with other applications. As far as we
know, this is the first work to introduce CapsNet to the field of malware detection.
3.3.1 CAPSNET ARCHITECTURE
Although the machine learning community has not discovered generalized approaches
to optimize CapsNet architecture, a well engineered system can usually be identified by
manageable efforts to explore the design space. To this end, we have experimented a range
of architectural options for CapsNet and arrived at a design that works well in most scenarios.
In fact, our preliminary experiments show that miner detection is not highly sensitive to the
CapsNet architecture.
The proposed architecture contains one convolutional layer and two capsule layers as
illustrated in Fig. 15. The first layer, i.e., the convolutional layer, has 32 kernels with size of
3×3×1 and stride 1, followed by ReLU activation. This layer’s job is to detect basic features
of the input data sample. Layer 2, i.e., the PrimaryCaps layer, has 8 primary capsules that
receive the basic features detected by the previous layer and produce combinations of the
features. The third layer, called AppCaps, has n capsules, one for each application. Dynamic
routing is employed between capsules. The output of AppCaps is a 16×n matrix, which
essentially includes n vectors, each with a size of 16. The length of a vector (i.e., the square
root of sum of squares of the vector elements) will give us the probability of the presence of
the corresponding application [47].
To understand the effectiveness of the CapsNet-based approach, we have carried out
preliminary experiments. Similar to the experimental setting introduced in Sec. 3.2.4, we
choose 5 applications and run each application individually to record the 12 runtime system
parameters for 30 minutes at a sampling rate of 1 Hz. The data is then sliced with a window
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Figure 15. CapsNet architecture.

size of 5 to generate 360 samples per application. We again conduct training based on the
4-fold cross validation approach, i.e., we randomly divide the dataset into 4 parts and use
three parts for training and one for testing. The testing result is given in Table 9 (see the
column under Single APP). Note that this result is based on the assumption of only one
application is running at a time. With no surprise, it achieves high accuracy of 0.95. But this
does not necessarily make it a better solution than CNN, because our goal is to effectively
detect a miner under the mix-app settings. In other words, while training is based on data
by running each application individually, we anticipate the trained CapsNet to detect the
miner even when it is mixed with other simultaneously running applications. To this end,
we further collect 3600 mix-app samples for testing purpose only. These samples mix 2, 3,
or 4 applications. As shown in Table 9, the testing result is stunningly promising, with a
detection rate of as high as 0.99, which is in a sharp contrast to the CNN approaches that are
unable to detect more than 25% of the mining activities. At the same time, the false positive
rate is as lows as 0.01. Note that it is reasonable to observe a higher “Miner Detection”
accuracy than “Single App.” It is because the former only targets at the miner, while the
latter intends to detect all 5 classes of applications.
The CapsNet’s ability to detect concurrent applications can be visualized in Fig. 16. As
discussed earlier, the output of the AppCaps layer is a 16×5 matrix, or 5 vectors. The length
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Figure 16. Visualization of the output of AppCaps layer.

of a vector, measured by the square root of the sum of squares of its elements, indicates the
probability of the presence of the corresponding application. We reshape the 16×5 matrix to
a 1× 80 array for convenient visualization. In this array, the first interval (including elements
1-16) corresponds to the first vector; the second interval (i.e., elements 17-32) represents the
second vector; so on and so forth. We have marked each interval by their corresponding
application (as shown at the top of Fig. 16). If the length of a vector is large, we should
observe large absolute values in the corresponding interval. Fig. 16 illustrates three curves
obtained from three experiments, i.e., by running web browser only, or running both game
and miner, or running game, music, and video simultaneously. The green solid line represents
the sample of running web-browser only. It has dramatically larger absolute values in the 4th
interval (i.e., [48,64]), showing that it belongs to the class of web browser. The greater values
of the blue dashed line in intervals 1 and 2 reveal that both game and miner are running
in the system. Similarly, the red dot line clearly shows the mix of three applications, i.e.,
game, music, and video.
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3.3.2 MINER DETECTION ACROSS DEVICE MODELS
We have demonstrated the effectiveness of CapsNet for miner detection, with a detection
accuracy of as high as 99%. While the results are encouraging, it is worth pointing out that,
in the above discussion, the training and testing data are gathered from the same device. In
reality, users own different devices, and worse yet, the devices are often in different models.
Ideally, we want to train a CapsNet that is applicable to all devices. However, this usually
results in poor performance as evidenced by the results shown in Table 10, where “Single
Device” denotes the experimental setting where training and testing are carried out based
on the data from a single device; “Cross Device” indicates the experiments conducted in a
way that training is based on data from a device, while testing is on a different device but of
the same model; “Cross Model” shows the results where training and testing are conducted
on different devices in different models (e.g., training on a Dell OptiPlex 7440 and testing
on a Dell Precision 5520).
As shown in Table 10, sufficiently high detection accuracy (i.e., 96%) is achievable under
the Cross Device setting, because the devices are similar as long as they are in the same
model. However, the Cross Model performance is deteriorated sharply, with the detection
rate barely around 20%. We have explored several options to slice the testing data (with
a window size of 5, 15, and 25, respectively). They all yield similar results. The poor
performance is not unexpected though, given the dramatic difference between training and
testing datasets since they are obtained from very different devices. It is clear that the
approach to directly apply a pre-trained CapsNet on other devices in different models is
ineffective.

Observations on Feature Clusters
The unsatisfactory results motivate us to explore possible methods to address the issue of
miner detection across device models. Since CapsNet has demonstrated supreme performance
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Table 10. CapsNet Single Device, Cross Device and Cross Model Performance.
Model
Single Device CapsNet 5x12
Cross Device CapsNet 5x12
Cross Model CapsNet 5x12
Cross Model CapsNet 15x12
Cross Model CapsNet 25x12
Cross Model CapsNet with Vector Projection
Two-layer CapJack
Window-Based Two-layer CapJack

Miner Detection
0.9895
0.9633
0.2108
0.2174
0.2091
0.2970
0.8763
0.9973

on a given device, the trained CapsNet model appears capable to extract the features of
individual applications and draw a precise boundary between the clusters in the feature
space. Therefore, when it is applied across different devices, it is sensible to speculate that
the trained CapsNet will still extract the features of the applications. However, the feature
space may have been shifted, thus leading to misclassification.
To show this conjecture, we conduct an experiment by collecting samples of individual
applications that run on the new device. We input them to the CapsNet model. Each output
is a probability array, labeled by corresponding application. Based on our conjecture, samples
of the same application will fall into a cluster in the feature space. To visualize the samples in
the feature space, we again use t-SNE to map them to a 2-D space as illustrated in Fig. 14.
Fig. 14(b) shows the t-SNE based on the samples collected on the original device, which
are well clustered and have clear boundaries. Fig. 14(c) is based on the results on the new
device. As can be seen, they are still well clustered, but the shapes of the clusters have been
changed and their boundaries have been shifted.

Naive Approaches for Feature Clusters Transformation
Clearly, if we can locate the feature clusters of the new device and redraw the boundaries,
we may be able to transfer a trained CapsNet model to new devices. To this end, we
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have explored a seemingly reasonable, but unsuccessful approach, aiming to recover the new
feature boundaries using vector projection. The basic idea is to collect a small number of
samples on the new device, which can be done quickly. We can even simplify the process by
offering synthetic application binaries that mimic the applications’ system behaviors without
real installation. Then a linear transformation can be established between the feature space of
the previously trained CapsNet model and the shifted feature space based on the new device.
Subsequently, a sample collected on the new device can be projected back to the previously
trained feature space for classification. We implement this approach and summarize its
results in Table 10 (denoted by “Cross Model CapsNet with Vector Projection”). As can
be seen, it yields poor performance of around 30% accuracy. After a careful analysis, we
discover that the vectors of individual applications are non-orthogonal in the feature space
and thus the projection does not precisely preserve the classification probabilities.
A Two-Layer Approach to Recover Feature Boundary
As demonstrated earlier, a trained CapsNet model can effectively extract the features
even when it is applied to different devices. The problem is that the shapes and boundaries
of the feature clusters have been changed, so the previously trained CapsNet model cannot
be directly applied to a new device. But we can employ it as the first layer, and use its
output to build a second layer classifier. This approach is named Two-Layer CapJack. More
specifically, as shown in Fig. 17, the CapsNet was trained by the data collected from device
A. In order to transplant it to the device B, a small number of samples must be collected
on the latter. In our experiments, as few as 50 samples can suffice the needs, which can be
completed within one minute given the sampling rate of 1 Hz.
The new samples are fed to the trained CapsNet, each yielding an output that is a 16×
5 matrix, or 5 vectors. The length of each vector is calculated as the square root of the
sum of squares of the vector elements, which shows the probability of the presence of the
corresponding application. Thus, we arrive at a 1×5 probability array. One probability array
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is produced for each sample. The probability arrays are labeled according to the presence
of miner. Thus we can accumulate a small set of training data, which are used to train an
SVM.
To classify any sample from device B, the sample will first pass through CapsNet to
get the probability array, which is subsequently used as the input of the trained SVM. The
output of the SVM is the probability of the sample including or not including a miner. Note
that this is a few-shots model adjustment, where the number of samples collected from the
new device is rather limited. Compared to other machine learning models, SVM performs
better at dealing with small datasets. In the meantime, since CapsNet can effectively extract
features of applications, we combine these two techniques to construct a 2-layer classification
system to achieve the best performance.
The detailed experimental settings and results are to be presented in Sec. 3.4, but a quick
look of the two-layer CapJack’s performance can be found in Table 10. The miner detection
rate improves dramatically to 0.88.
Note that the above discussion is based on a single sample. The accuracy can be further
increased to nearly 1.0 by using a window-based two-layer CapJack approach. More specifically, instead of collecting a single sample for miner detection, we consider a time window
during which the system runtime data are sampled. As to be shown in the next section,
a small window (e.g., 11 seconds) would sufice to achieve high performance. The two-layer
CapJack is applied to test each sample in the window. The vast majority of them (i.e., 88%)
should report correct results. Thus, a majority vote is taken to determine whether a miner is
present or not. Let p denote the detection rate of a single sample, then the overall detection

P
n
probability in a window with n samples can be calculated as 1 − ni=dn/2e (1 − p)i pn−i n−i
.
Our experiments verify the result and further show that the window-based two-layer CapJack
enables fast and accurate miner detection.
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Figure 17. The proposed two-layer classification system.

3.4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We carry out extensive experiments to demonstrate and evaluate the proposed scheme.
Our default experimental setting includes five applications: a music player (Spotify), a video
player (Local Video), a game (Human: Fall Flat), web-browsing, and the Coinhive miner.
More applications (including additional miners) are used in some experiments to be discussed
later. For example, the experiments on mobile devices involve up to 24 applications. To
mimic the real-world malicious mining, we develop a PHP-based website which incorporates
the CoinHive Javascript.
We first gather training data by running each application individually to collect 12 system
runtime parameters (as summarized in Table 8). We record each application for 30 minites
with a sampling rate of 1 Hz. We further slice the data along the time dimension with
a window size of 5, yielding 360 samples per application. Each sample is labeled by the
corresponding application. The data collection is completed on 10 Dell workstations (Model:
OptiPlex 7440) and 3 Dell laptops (Model: Precision 5520). The training is completed on a
PC with i7-4770 processor and GTX-1080Ti GPU.
A series of experiments are conducted under different settings to evaluate the accuracy

55
and robustness of the proposed scheme. The testing data are collected based on mixed
applications (i.e., running multiple applications simultaneously), from the same device and
different devices in different models. The detailed results and analyses are summarized below.
3.4.1 IMPACT OF NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS
In general, the classification accuracy of a machine learning model decreases with the
increase of the number of classes. While the same principle is presumably applicable to
CapJack too, it is worth a quantitative study to understand the robustness of the proposed
scheme. To this end, we vary the maximum number of mixed applications to evaluate the
miner detection rate. As shown in Table 11, the proposed scheme adapts to the number of
mixed applications gracefully. When the experiment is conducted on a single device, i.e.,
the testing and training data are gathered from the same device, the miner detection rate
is maintained above 92%, even when all 5 applications are running simultaneously. Note
that, there are actually many more background processes (e.g., those that are part of the
operating system) running at the same time when we collect the testing data samples. The
proposed approach appears very robust to such background noise and interference. Similar
trend is observed when the testing is conducted across different device models, although the
overall detection rate is naturally lower (ranging from 90% to 81%).

Table 11. Detection Accuracy with Different Number of Mixed Apps.
Model
Single Device CapsNet
Single Device CapsNet
Single Device CapsNet
Single Device CapsNet
Cross Model Two-Layer
Cross Model Two-Layer
Cross Model Two-Layer
Cross Model Two-Layer

CapJack
CapJack
CapJack
CapJack

Number of APP
2
3
4
5
2
3
4
5

Miner Detection
0.9937
0.9849
0.9525
0.9216
0.9008
0.8841
0.8531
0.8115
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Table 12. Detection Accuracy for Different Miners.
Model
Single Device Miner A & Music
Single Device Miner A & B & Game
Single Device Miner B & C & Video
Single Device Miner A &B & C & Web
Single Device Miner A & B & C & Music & Web
Cross Model Miner A & Music
Cross Model Miner A & B & Game
Cross Model Miner B & C & Video
Cross Model Miner A & B & C & Web
Cross Model Miner A & B & C & Music & Web

Miner Detection
0.9777
0.9681
0.9726
0.9611
0.9564
0.9138
0.9125
0.8991
0.8953
0.8620

3.4.2 DETECTION OF DIFFERENT MINERS
The proposed scheme is trained on the CoinHive miner. The hackers may obviously
utilize different miners to initiate their attacks. Can CapJack detect other similar miners
without retraining? To this end, we further consider three other miners: cpuminer [58],
Ufasoft miner [59], and bfgminer [60]. We collect new testing data by running them in various
combinations together with other applications. As shown in Table 12, the proposed approach
(without retraining) can effectively detect the existence of the new miners with an accuracy
of above 96% on a single device and 86% in the cross model settings. The results demonstrate
the robustness of the proposed scheme. The promising results are attributed to the fact that
although the miners can be implemented in different ways, their underlying principle remains
the same (for similar crypto-currencies). Thus the runtime system parameters show similar
patterns in the CapJack’s feature space.
3.4.3 WINDOW SIZE IN WINDOW-BASED TWO-LAYER CAPJACK
Note that Tables 11 & 12 show the average detection accuracy based on individual samples. As introduced in Sec. 3.3.2, the window-based two-layer CapJack can effectively achieve
perfect miner detection. More specifically, we implement an online version of the proposed
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scheme, which continuously records the 12 system runtime parameters, again at a sampling
rate of 1 Hz. The samples within a predefined window are tested by the two-layer CapJack
scheme. Then a majority vote is employed to determine if a miner is present. We vary the
window size from 3 to 15 samples. The results are illustrated in Fig. 18. As can be seen,
the false negatives and false positives decrease sharp to below 0.01 when the window size
reaches 7. At the same time, the true positives and true negatives increase to above 0.99.
This observation matches the detection probability derived in Sec. 3.3.2. Note that, given
each sample is 5 seconds and the consecutive samples overlap 4 seconds, we need merely 11
seconds to accumulate 7 samples. Here we used the sampling rate of 1 Hz. Hence the time
window is 11 seconds. If we want to detect the miner sooner, we can increase the sampling
rate to reduce the window duration.
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Figure 18. Impact of window size.
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Table 13. Performance on Mobile Devices and Clouds.
Setting
Mobile Single Device
Mobile Single Device
Mobile Single Device
Mobile Cross Model
Mobile Cross Model
Mobile Cross Model
AWS Single Device
AWS Single Device
AWS Single Device
AWS Cross Model
AWS Cross Model
AWS Cross Model

Number of APP
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3

Miner Detection
0.9813
0.9694
0.9233
0.8839
0.8626
0.8288
0.9923
0.9796
0.9587
0.9136
0.8905
0.8633

3.4.4 MINER DETECTION ON MOBILE DEVICE AND CLOUD SERVER
The above experiments are conducted based on PCs. We also test the proposed scheme
on mobile devices and cloud servers, which are frequently targeted by hackers. It is worth
pointing out that, although the two-layer CapJack works well in cross model settings, the
different models are all PCs. Our results show that it is challenging to adapt the trained PC
model to mobile devices or clouds, due to the dramatic difference between these computing
platforms. Therefore, we need to train new models for them. However, it is a manageable
effort, given PC, mobile and cloud are the only three vulnerable platforms frequently targeted
by malicious miners.
To this end, we use 20 Samsung S7 and 5 iPhone 7 plus to collect data. We select 8
application types for training: video, browser, music, email, call, chat, miner, and game.
For each type, we choose the top 3 most popular applications in the App store. Thus, a
total of 24 applications are considered in the experiments. Since most mobile users do not
run more than 3 applications simultaneously, we construct various experimental settings by
mixing up to three applications. In each experiment, we collect the mobile device’s runtime
system parameters as training and testing samples.
To study the performance on cloud servers, we use Amazon Web Services (AWS) for
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our experiments. We chose 5 popular applications on the cloud server for sample collection:
Miner, Scrapper, Web-server, Shadowsocks, and Media Streamer. We create five t2.micro
and five t2.xlarge AWS EC2 ubuntu instances for running the experiments and collecting
the same system runtime parameters as discussed before for PCs.
The experimental results are summarized in Table 13. As can be seen, the miner detection
accuracy shows a similar trend as the results obtained from PCs, demonstrating the wide
applicability of the proposed scheme on various computation platforms. When the windowbased approach is adopted, we can again achieve a perfect detection accuracy.
3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, we have proposed an innovative approach, named CapJack, to detect
malicious cryptocurrency mining activities by using the latest CapsNet technology. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work to introduce CapsNet to the field of malware
detection. It is particularly effective to detect malicious miners under multitasking environments where multiple applications run simultaneously. Built upon the success of the
CapsNet-based approach, we have further developed a two-layer classification system, which
can effectively transform a pretrained model to detect miners on new devices. This is intrinsically important to achieve practical usability given the wide variety of devices used by
victims. The work has delivered a well engineered prototype. The experiments have revealed
valuable empirical insights into the design space and the application of CapsNet for detecting malicious mining activities. Experimental data have shown the appealing performance
of CapJack, with a detection rate of as high as 87% instantly and 99% within a window of
11 seconds.
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CHAPTER 4

EXPLORING THE VULNERABILITIES OF DEEP LEARNING
TECHNOLOGY (INVISIBLE POISON)

This chapter discovers a new clean label attack, named Invisible Poison, which stealthily
and aggressively plants a backdoor in neural networks (NN). It converts a trigger to noise
concealed inside regular images for training NN in order to plant a backdoor that can be
later activated by the trigger. The attack has the following distinct properties. First, it is a
blackbox attack, requiring zero-knowledge about the target NN model. Second, it employs
“invisible poison” to achieve stealthiness where the trigger is disguised as ‘noise’ that is
therefore invisible to humans, but at the same time still remains significant in the feature
space and thus is highly effective to poison training data.
4.1 PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS AND MOTIVATIONS
While machine learning is embraced as an important tool for efficiency and productivity,
it is becoming an increasingly attractive target for cybercriminals. For example, recent
studies have shown a class of aggressive attacks by planting backdoor in neural network
(NN) models using the strategy of data poisoning [22, 23, 61–64]. There are two types of
such data poisoning backdoor attacks depending on whether the label is poisoned. The first
type of attack poisons both the image and the label of a portion of training dataset [22, 61].
An attacker creates a unique pattern called trigger (see Fig. 19(d) for example), stamps
the trigger on a set of training images, and re-tags them with a target label. The trained
NN behaves normally with clean inputs; but whenever the trigger is stamped onto an input
image, the backdoor in the NN is activated to misclassify the input to the target label.
While this attack is highly effective, it makes a strong assumption that the attacker has full
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knowledge of the training process and full control of the training data labels. Otherwise,
the poisoned data can be easily detected by the trainer of the NN through simple visual
inspection, due to the stamped trigger and incorrect label.
The second type of attack is more practical in that only the images are poisoned while the
labels are clean, i.e., not tampered with. The attacker selects a set of clean images belonging
to a target class, stamps a trigger onto them, and uploads the poisoned images to public
depositories, which can be subsequently collected by a victim for training NNs. Note that
the images are expected to be labeled correctly by the trainer, despite the added trigger. As
a result, a backdoor will be planted. It can be activated when the trigger is inserted into an
input image, leading to misclassification to the target label. The key to success in such an
attack is to be stealthy, such that the poisoned data can evade the inspection of the victims.
Common approaches [23, 62, 63] include making the trigger small and/or translucent (see
Fig. 19(d) and (e)) or simply using a random noise pattern as the trigger (see Fig. 19(f)).
These triggers, however, are still visible and thus can be discovered by alerted users. Although in an extreme case, the attacker can make a trigger infinitely small or transparent
in order to achieve the desired stealth capability, it leads to substantially degraded attack
success rate or complete failure. Another approach [64] is to create an imperceptible perturbation (similar to adversarial example) to plant backdoors. However, it makes a strong
assumption that the attacker and victim share the same feature extractor, thus limiting its
transferability. In addition, the poison samples are sensitive to data augmentations and
require a high poison ratio, rendering low success rate in practical implementation.
Contributions of This Work. The main contribution of this chapter is to report a new
clean-label backdoor attack, Invisible Poison, which is stealthy, robust and devastating
(Fig. 20). It converts a trigger to ‘noise’ that can be concealed in regular images. Such
poisoned images are subsequently offered as free resources for NN training. As a result,
victims may unconsciously plant a backdoor in their NNs, which can be activated by the
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Figure 19. Illustration of Different Poison Attacks.

attacker using the trigger. Invisible Poison has several distinguished properties: (1) Blackbox: the attack requires zero-knowledge of the target NN. (2) Invisible Poison: the attack
is stealthy because the trigger is disguised as ‘noise’ in regular images and hence can easily
evade human inspection (see Fig. 19(g)), but at the same time remains significant in the
feature space and thus is highly effective to poison training data. (3) Lethality: the attack
is practical, robust, and devastating. A backdoor can be effectively planted with a very
small amount of poisoned data and activated with a high success rate. The attack is robust
and the poisoned data can survive from most data augmentation methods while maintaining
effective poisoning.
The proposed Invisible Poison attack is implemented in PyTorch [65] and fully tested on
multiple benchmark data sets including MNIST [66], Cifar10 [67], and ImageNet [68]. The
experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the attack under various settings, including
digital attacks with loss-free images and physical attacks where poisoned images are lossy
due to limited resolution of printer, display, or camera. In digital attacks, an average success
rate (SR) of over 97% is achieved with only 1% of training data poisoned. With 2% of
poisoned training data, the SR can reach over 99%. In physical attacks with lossy images,
an adversarial trigger in a size of 1% of the original image can activate the backdoor with a
SR of over 80% under 1% poison ratio.
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4.2 INVISIBLE POISON ATTACK
As shown in Fig. 20, our attack model assumes the attacker is either a malicious data
provider or an individual who publishes poisoned data on the Internet. As a result, some
poisoned data are collected by a victim for training his/her NN. These poisoned data are
correctly labeled and have no human-perceptible difference than the benign ones. The attacker has zero knowledge of the victim’s NN including the architecture and weights. Our
model is thus defined as a blackbox attack. The attacker’s goal is to plant a hidden backdoor
in the model trained by the victim, which can be later activated by the attacker.
4.2.1 CONVERT IMAGE TO NOISE AND PLANT A BACKDOOR
Model Architecture and Optimization. The attacker aims to convert a trigger to a
seemingly noise image, and combine it in a training image to confuse the NN training. To
effectively plant and activate the backdoor, the noised trigger image should fire the same set
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of neurons in the NN model as the original trigger does. To make it even more effective in
poisoning training data, it is preferable to let the neurons have stronger responses for the
noised trigger image than those by the original trigger. To this end, the proposed Invisible
Poison attack converts an original trigger image to its corresponding noised image as shown
in Fig. 21.
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Figure 21. An Auto-encoder Architecture to Convert Trigger to Noised Image.

The clean image is first fed into a U-net based auto-encoder, which is similar to the one
used for image-to-image translation [69]. The auto-encoder E : RM ×N 7→ RM ×N maps x to
E(x) ∈ RM ×N . The generated noised image is then fed into a feature extractor (the first 5
shallow layers of the pre-trained Resnet18 [70]) with fixed weights to extract features from
the noised image. The shallow layers are used to achieve a higher transferability over different
NN architectures since they have proven to share common features across different models
in related learning tasks. It is also essential to set all the batch normalization layers [71]
in the feature extractor unfixed, which will let each layer adopt mean and variance from
the current batch for normalization instead of using the preset parameters. Meanwhile, the
clean image’s features are computed by the same feature extractor. Features from the noised
image are multiplied with a small coefficient µ (0.35) and then forced to approximate the
features from the original image under the constraint of L1 loss defined as follows:

L = Ex∼px |µφ (E(x)) − φ(x)|1 .

(1)
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where φ is the feature extractor and px is the distribution of input data x. We use backpropagation with Adam optimizer to adjust weights of the auto-encoder to generate the
noised image.
Converted Image Examples. Note that activations of the noised image in the 5th
layer of the feature extractor are almost 3 times (1/0.35) of those from its original clean
image. Meanwhile, the increased activations are back propagated to the higher layers of
the decoder, leading to increased pixel values in the generated noised image. Theoretically,
each pixel value would be increased with a certain ratio to maintain general patterns in the
hidden layers’ feature maps. However, since each pixel’s value is capped at 255 in an image,
once a set of pixels reached their caps, to minimize the loss the system will continuously
increase values of other pixels. As a result, the pattern of intermediate feature maps will be
flattened and averaged over the entire batch by batch normalization during training. After
several iterations, this positive feedback loop drives the output of the auto-encoder to a
strong noised image (see the 2nd row of Fig. 22, along with their corresponding original
images in the 1st row. More examples are included in the supplementary material).
Equivalence for Classification and In Image Space. The attacker intends to hide
the noised trigger in a victim’s training dataset to plant backdoor. Here we further offer an
insight into the noised trigger, showing that the NN model can retrieve the similar features
from the noised trigger as those from the original trigger. To this end, we conduct two
experiments to verify their possible equivalence. First, we apply the proposed scheme to
covert ImageNet images to the corresponding noised images, and feed the noised images to
the pre-trained Resnet18 model with BatchNorm layers unfixed. Results show a classification
accuracy of 67.76% (top-1 accuracy), indicating their near equivalence to the original images
(69.76%) in the classification feature space. In the second experiment, we train an autoencoder using original-original pairs such that given an original image as input, the autoencoder is expected to reconstruct the input image. After training, we apply the trained
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Figure 22. Images Hidden in Noise. Row 1: Original clean images; Row 2: Corresponding
noised images of Row 1; Row 3: Auto-Encoder reconstructed images of Row 2.

auto-encoder with BatchNorm layers unfixed to the noised images in the second row in
Fig. 22. The third row in Fig. 22 are the outputs. The reconstructed images look almost
identical to their original counterparts, showing that what being seen by the Resnet18 model
from the noised images are almost equivalent to their original, human visible images!
Planting a Backdoor. Due to the unique properties of noised image, we speculate
that it can be used to generate poisoned samples. Specifically, when we linearly combine it
with a regular image, the poisoned image will be almost identical to its original version in
human vision due to its noise-like nature. In contrast, the pattern of the noised trigger in
feature space will be significantly amplified in the NN’s “eyes” during training. An example
can be seen in Fig. 23 (Left), which is invisible to human but the reconstructed version by
the auto-encoder clearly shows the added trigger has been captured by the NN (see Fig. 23
(Right). More examples are included in the supplementary material). To plant a backdoor,
we first convert an original trigger to a noised trigger using the architecture introduced in
Fig 21. Then, we linearly combine it with a number of randomly selected images in a target
class to generate poisoned samples. The poisoned samples keep their original label (i.e., the
target class) and are mixed into the training set. After training with the poisoned data, we
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Figure 23. Poisoned images (left) and its reconstructed version (right).

anticipate the trained NN model will associate the noised trigger with the target label, thus
planting a backdoor. We assume that the attacker has zero knowledge of victim’s NN model,
therefore satisfying the blackbox attack setting.
4.2.2 DIGITAL ATTACK
A Digital Attack means that we use a loss-free noised trigger image to activate the
backdoor planted in NN models. A trigger image preferably contains patterns that are
unlikely to be present in any natural image. An example is given in Fig. 19a). Now, we
study whether or not a training dataset poisoned by the noised trigger can plant a backdoor
in NN models in the context of Digital Attack. We conduct an experiment by selecting
10 classes from the ImageNet dataset, each class with 500 training and 50 testing images
(named as ImageNet10 thereafter). We first consider a simplified scenario, where we use the
noised trigger image shown in Fig. 19b) to poison (i.e., linearly combine with) a portion of
training images in the targeted class.
Digital Attack Experiment. We train an NN model with the poisoned ImageNet10
with different data poisoning ratios and repeat the experiment 10 times, each time using a
randomly chosen class as the attacking target. Table 14 shows the results obtained from
our experiment, where “Clean Image Accuracy” represents regular accuracy with clean images under different NN models, “Performance Loss” indicates decreases of the classification
accuracy by the backdoored NN models as compared to the normal NN models without
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Table 14. Performances under Different Poison Ratios. SR: Success Rate.
Poison
Clean Image
Ratio
Accuracy
10% (500)
0.980
5% (250)
0.981
1% (50)
0.982
0.5% (25)
0.981

Performance
Loss
0.005
0.003
0.001
0.001

Digital Attack
SR
0.995
0.997
0.972
0.943

backdoor, and “Digital Attack SR” indicates success rates (SR) of activating the backdoor
by a loss-free noised trigger.
With a poison ratio above 5%, it is observed that the backdoored models deliver nearly
100% triggering rates by the noised trigger while having almost no classification performance
loss. While we expect the attack SR would degrade with decreased poison ratios, the SR
with the noised trigger anti-intuitively remains high (see the fourth column in Table 14). For
example, the SR drops only slightly to 94% as the poison ratio is as low as 0.5%, which is
better than expected since there is only a total of 25 poisoned images in the whole training
dataset.
Insights into Digital Attack. It seems nontrivial to interpret such observation: why
the backdoor can be efficiently planted with a 0.5% poison ratio? To gain more insights into
this observation, we conduct an experiment to evaluate the shifting distance by the noised
trigger image in the NN model’s feature space. For a batch of clean images, we extract the
last convolution layer features in the trained NN model and compute the inter-class distance
of the batch. Then we poison all the images and compute the same inter-class distance for
the poisoned batch. Fig. 24(a)) shows the inter-class distances (normalized by the clean
image batch’s inter-class distance) for different poison strategies, where “+Shrunk” stands
for poisoning with the shrunk noised trigger image to the size of 44x44; “+0.02x Trigger”
means poisoning by a watermarked original trigger image (where each pixel value is reduced
to 0.02 of its original value); “+Noised” denotes the noised trigger image; and “+Random”
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represents adding random noise in training data. To visualize the approximate locations
of clean and poisoned images in the feature space, we map the features to 2D space using
t-SNE [72] as shown in Fig. 24(b)).
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The largest shifting distance is achieved by “+Noised” (Fig. 24(a)), and a backdoor is
planted by moving the poisoned target class images far away from their original locations
in the feature space as shown in Fig. 24(b)). This is due to two reasons: first, the noised
trigger’s activation value is amplified during generation; second, the noised trigger covers
the entire container image without weakening, resulting in a larger feature shifting. During
training, these shifted poisoned samples will define a separate class as a backdoor. As
illustrated in Fig. 24(c)), once the NN model is trained and all decision boundaries are
defined, a poisoned sample will trigger the backdoor, regardless of which original class label
the poisoned image carries. Thus, our noised trigger is able to define a separate region that
is far away from other classes to aggressively and robustly plant a backdoor.
4.2.3 PHYSICAL ATTACK
Physical Attack with Lossy Noised Trigger Images. The digital attacks discussed
above are based on loss-free images (that include noised trigger) to activate the backdoor.
We now further study physical attack with lossy noised images due to limited resolutions of
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Table 15. Physical Attack SR using Different Types of Triggers.
Poison Ratio
10%
5%
1%
0.5%

Lossy Noised Ori Adv Trigger
0.078
0.093
0.985
0.084
0.086
0.976
0.062
0.088
0.972
0.079
0.032
0.952

printers, displays, or cameras. For example, we display a noised image (linear combination
of a noised trigger image with a target class image) on an LED monitor and capture it by
a camera. The captured image is then used to trigger the backdoored model trained on
ImageNet10. The 2nd column in Table 15 shows that lossy noised images perform poorly in
physical attacks with SRs lower than 9% regardless of the poison ratio. This is due to their
noise-like appearances which can be significantly interfered by the physical noise.
Physical Attack with Original Trigger. Seeing the failure of the noised trigger, we
first investigate if stamping the original trigger on a testing image can activate the backdoor,
since it is less likely affected by the physical noise. As shown in the 3rd column of Table 15,
the SRs are all below 10% under different poison ratios. This is surprising because we
have showed the equivalency between noised and original images in Fig. 22. Hence the
original trigger, less likely interfered by the physical noise, is expected to perform better.
Nevertheless, we note that the equivalency in Fig. 22 is based on a setting where the entire
batch of noised images are used to reconstruct the original images. Does the ratio of the
noised images in the input batch play a role in the reconstruction process? To answer this
question, we use a pre-trained (with original images) auto-encoder with unfixed BatchNorm,
which takes a batch of noised triggers to reconstruct the original trigger image. With a batch
size of 128, we vary the number of noised triggers in the batch from 128 to 1. The results
are shown in columns 2-5 in Fig. 25. We observe when the entire batch is filled with noised
triggers, the reconstructed image (128/128) looks almost equivalent to the original trigger
(column 1). In contrast, as the number of poisoned images decreases, the patterns of the

71
trigger in the reconstructed images become blur and deformed. Therefore, the equivalence
shown in Fig. 22 is valid only if the whole batch of images are noised such that the unfixed
BatchNorm layers can remove the added noise through local normalization. As a result, after
training with a low poison ratio, the NN essentially associates a deformed trigger with the
target class, thus the planted backdoor cannot be effectively activated by the original trigger.
This observation motivates us to employ a Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) based scheme to
retrieve the deformed trigger for effectively activating the backdoor.

Ori

128/128

64/128

12/128

1/128

Figure 25. Reconstructed images with different poisoned images in a batch. Col 1: Original;
Cols 2-5: Reconstructed images.

Adversarial Trigger Generation. Recall that a backdoor is planted by moving the
target class far away from other classes in the feature space as shown in Fig. 24(b)). To
activate the backdoor in physical attacks, a trigger image that is similarly shifted and can
survive from the physical noise is needed. To this end, we design a generative adversarial
model as shown in Fig. 26 to generate an adversarial trigger based on the noised trigger for
effective physical attack. In the model, we use a layer named “Lossy Layer (LL) [73]” to
simulate the lossy physical noise caused by display, camera or printer [73]. Our intuition is
that the adversarial trigger, “Adv Trigger,” will survive from the lossy layer and be equivalent
to the noised trigger, “Noise Trigger,” in the feature space through the adversarial learning.
Note that the noised trigger is used to plant the backdoor, therefore, the adversarial trigger
that is equivalent to the noised trigger in the feature space and survived from the physical
noise loss should be able to effectively activate the backdoor.
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Algorithm 1: Adversarial Trigger Generation
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Input: Image data X , Original trigger Tori , Noised trigger Tnoi , Batch size m = 128,
Adam hyperparameters α = 0.0001, β1 = 0, β2 = 0.9;
Require: ncritic = 1, Initial discriminator parameters w0 , initial generator parameters θ0 ;
Output: Adversarial trigger Tadv ;
while θ has not converged do
for t = 0, ..., ncritic do
Sample a batch Xba from the real data X ;
Randomly select one sample of target class from Xba with index k;
k +T
k
xnoi ← Xba
noi , xadv ← Xba + Gθ (Tori );
0,..k−1,k+1..m S
0,..k−1,k+1..m S
Xnoi ← Xba
xnoi , Xadv ← Xba
LL(xadv );
k
k
L ← Dw (Xadv ) − Dw (Xori ) ;
w ← Adam (∇w L, w, α, β1 , β2 )
end
Sample a batch Xba from the real data;
k + G (T );
Randomly select one sample of target class from Xba with index xadv ← Xba
θ ori
S
0,..k−1,k+1..m
Xadv ← Xba
xadv ;


θ ← Adam ∇θ − Dw Xadv )k , θ, α, β1 , β2 ;
end

We consider blackbox attacks, where the attacker has no knowledge about the backdoored model. As shown in Fig. 26, the original trigger is fed into an auto-encoder to obtain
an adversarial mask (“Adv Trigger”), which is combined with an image of the target class
(denoted as x), resulting in xadv . We pass the xadv through LL (random crop, JPEG compression, dropout, etc.) to emulate the physical loss in the real world. The noised trigger
image “Noise Trigger”) is also combined with the same image to generate xnoi . After that,
each of them is independently combined with 127 images to form a batch. Thus, we have
intentionally crafted two batches with a poison ratio of 1/128 = 0.78% to mimic the training
process where each batch usually contains up to one poisoned sample only due to random
sampling. Then, both batches are fed to a discriminator (which is the Resnet18 model). The
overall system is trained with the typical WGAN [74] loss in which the discriminator D aims
to distinguish the adversarial trigger poisoned data xadv from the noised trigger poisoned
data xnoi . The algorithmic details are given in Algo. 1.
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Figure 26. Adversarial Trigger Generation.

Physical Attack with Adversarial Trigger. The adversarial trigger contains strong
spatial patterns (Fig. 26c)) and is equivalent to the noise trigger in feature space. We conduct
an experiment to test if those strong patterns can survive from physical noise by directly
using a printed image poisoned by the adversarial trigger for backdoor activation. Results
(see “Adv Trigger” in Table 15) show that the adversarial trigger achieves attack SRs at
least 95.2% under all poising ratios.
4.3 COUNTERMEASURES
The noised trigger is almost invisible to human when it is combined with clean images,
rendering human detection impossible. Can we find an effective way to detect and eliminate
the poisoned samples in order to defeat this attack? To answer this question, we explore two
methods.
Supervised Poison Sample Detection. A straightforward approach is to train a classifier
to differentiate poisoned from clean images. A defender needs to have both types of samples.
Since the two types of samples differ significantly in the feature space as discussed earlier,
we speculate that a trained classifier can perform well in detecting poisoned samples. In
our experiment, we train a Resnet18 classifier using only 50 clean samples and 50 poisoned
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samples. Then, we test it with 1,000 clean samples and 1,000 poisoned ones. The detection
accuracy is shown in Fig. 27(a), with a satisfactory detection rate of 99% and a false alarm
rate of 0.6%. However, this method requires the defender to have captured the poisoned
samples and label them correctly, which is often impractical. To this end, we explore another
approach outlined below.
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Figure 27. Confusion Matrix in Poison Sample Detection.

Unsupervised Poison Sample Detection. Assume a defender does not have the poisoned
samples, since they cannot or are extremely difficult to be detected by human. On the other
hand, a poisoned sample reveals the trigger when it is reconstructed by a trained autoencoder. We thus propose to use a well trained auto-encoder to reconstruct images seen
by the targeted model. For clean samples, the reconstructed images should be similar to
the original inputs. In contrast, a reconstructed poisoned sample would differ significantly
from the original poisoned sample. Therefore, we can detect poisoned samples by comparing
them with their reconstructed counterpart. To this end, we conduct an experiment by
using the aforementioned auto-encoder to reconstruct images of 1000 samples. The majority
of the dataset are clean samples. In the experiment, we randomly inject 100 poisoned
samples into the dataset. Then, we compare the reconstructed images with their original
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version by calculating distance D between the two images at pixel level. As discussed earlier,
the reconstructed image of a poisoned sample should have a relatively large difference as
compared to a clean image, i.e., Dpoison >> Dclean . Therefore, we calculate the Dmean (mean
value of all D’s) as the threshold. Since the majority of the dataset are clean samples, Dmean
should be mostly decided by clean samples. Any image with D > Dmean is identified as a
poisoned sample. As shown in Fig. 27(b), this scheme can achieve a success detection rate
of 98%.
4.4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Experimental Setup. We use a PC equipped with a Ryzen 2700x 3.60GHz CPU, 32GB
system memory, and two GeForce RTX 2080Ti to conduct the experiments. The machine
learning platform is Pytorch 1.1.0 [75] running on Ubuntu 18.04. We conduct the experiments
based on well-known benchmark datasets including MNIST, Cifar10, and ImageNet10. We
use the Adam optimizer to train this network with a learning rate of 0.001 for 200 epochs.
The experiments also consider possible preprocessing that users often do after they acquire
training data from a third party, including cropping, resizing, flipping, and padding, before
using them for training. We adopt a well-known auto-encoder architecture available in the
literature [69]. The partially-fixed feature extractor in Fig. 21 is based on the first five layers
of the pre-trained Resnet18 network.
Performances on Different Datasets. Table 16 shows SRs with full-sized triggers under
different poisoned ratios on a Resnet18 trained from end-to-end. It is observed that while
the SR is generally higher with more poisoned data, it remains 90% with only 0.5% poisoned
data except for MNIST, which achieves 89.3% at the poisoned ratio of 0.5%. Digital SRs are
usually higher than Physical SRs. We also observe a higher SR with a more sophisticated
dataset. When the number of channels increases from 1 (in MNIST) to 3 (in CIFAR10 and
ImageNet10) and the image size increases from 28 × 28 (MNIST) to 224 × 224 (ImageNet10),
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Table 16. Performances on Different Datasets (full-sized triggers). APL: Average Performance Loss. SR: Success Rate.
Poison Rate
2%

1%

0.5%

Metrics
MNIST
APL
0.003
Digital SR
0.990
Physical SR
0.963
APL
0.003
Digital SR
0.963
Physical SR
0.951
APL
0.002
Digital SR
0.906
Physical SR
0.893

CIFAR 10
0.005
0.995
0.968
0.004
0.971
0.962
0.003
0.918
0.912

ImageNet10
0.005
0.981
0.976
0.005
0.972
0.958
0.003
0.911
0.902

more information is encoded into the noised trigger, leading to increased SRs.
Effect of Trigger Size. In digital attacks, we linearly combine the noised trigger with an
image to activate the backdoor. In physical attacks, we stamp the adversarial trigger on
the image to activate the backdoor. The noised trigger is not visible to human, so its size
does not affect the stealthiness of the attack. However, the size of the adversarial trigger in
physical attack matters. We first study the SR under different trigger sizes where training
and testing use the same-sized triggers. The poison ratio is 1%.

Table 17. Success Rate vs. Trigger Size.
Physical

224 × 224
0.958

88 × 88 44 × 44 22 × 22 112 → 44 88 → 22
0.844
0.206
0.065
0.896
0.802

The results (based on ImageNet10) are shown in Table 17. The SR decreases dramatically
when the trigger size is reduced from 224 × 224 to 22 × 22 (see example adversarial triggers
with different sizes in the 2nd row of Fig. 26). Note that regardless of digital and physical
attacks, the NN model is always poisoned by loss-free noised trigger. Thus we can use a large
noised trigger for poisoning training data since it is invisible and use a smaller adversarial
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Table 18. Performances of Different Triggers on ImagesNet10. AUG: Augmentation.
Digital (2%)
Digital (1%)
Digital (0.5%)
Physical (2%)
Physical (1%)
Physical (0.5%)

Shrunk-AUG [62]
0.713
0.371
0.092
0.681
0.347
0.076

Watermark-AUG [62]
0.655
0.316
0.085
0.511
0.243
0.071

Fixed Noise-AUG [62]
0.296
0.101
0.042
0.166
0.063
0.002

CLB [23]
0.734
0.420
0.103
0.689
0.371
0.080

HTB [64]
0.592
0.405
0.110
0.586
0.401
0.092

CLB-AUG HTB-AUG
0.709
0.214
0.373
0.110
0.102
0.036
0.676
0.211
0.331
0.105
0.078
0.029

Our Approach-AUG
0.981
0.972
0.911
0.976
0.958
0.902

trigger to improve the desired stealthiness in physical attacks. The last two columns in
Table 17 illustrate the results, where “112 → 44” indicates that we use a 112 × 112 lossfree noised trigger for poisoning training data, while a 44 × 44 physical adversarial trigger
to attack. Compared to results under the columns “44 × 44” and “22 × 22”, SRs under
“112 → 44” and “88 → 22” are significantly improved. For instance, when using the
“112 → 44” instead of the “44 × 44” attack scheme, SR increases from 20% to almost 90%.
Similarly, when using “88 → 22” instead of “22 × 22,” SR increases from less than 10% to
over 80%. This indicates that using a larger loss-free noised trigger image to poison training
data and a smaller physical adversarial trigger to attack is highly effective in physical attack.
Comparison with Other Poison Approaches. We carry out an experiment by training a
VGG-16BN model with poisoned samples crafted by different techniques. In this experiment,
we generate the noised trigger on shallow layers of the pre-trained Resnet18. In the meantime,
we compare our work to [62] by resampling the original trigger size to 44 × 44 to be the
“Shrunk Trigger”, adjusting the transparency of the original trigger with a ratio of 0.02 to
be the “Watermark Trigger,” and generating a fixed random normal distributed noise with
size 224 × 224 multiplied with a ratio of 0.2 to be the “Random Noise Trigger.” We also
compare with two clean-label backdoor attacks: “Clean Label Backdoor (CLB)” [23] and
“Hidden Trigger Backdoor (HTB)” [64]. Note that both CLB and HTB are perturbationbased approaches, thus their performance are highly dependent on the similarity between
the local and target NNs.
We perform training on a VGG-16BN model from end-to-end based on ImageNet10 with
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a poison ratio ranging from 0.5% to 2%. The attack success rates are summarized in Table 18.
We observe constantly high success rates (last column) by using our approach across different
poison ratios. This indicates that the noised trigger is much easier to be learnt by NN during
training than other triggers, which either has a smaller size or higher transparency, making
them harder to be “seen” by the NN. Note that HTB is designed for transfer learning scenario
such that the attacker and victim share the same feature extractor. Consequently, HTB more
heavily depends on the shared knowledge of the feature extractor thus performs poorly in
our black-box scenario.
Survival Experiments with Augmentation. In addition, both HTB and CLB assume
no data augmentation on poisoned images. We observe a dramatic performance drop when
augmentations are applied on them (see “CLB-AUG” and “HTB-AUG”). In contrast, the
noised trigger can survive under various augmentations in all experiments, showing strong
robustness (last column in Table 18).

Table 19. Performances of Transferability under Digital Attack on ImageNet10, 2% Poison
Ratio).
Ours
HTB
CLB

Resnet18
0.981
0.742
0.780

Resnet34
0.994
0.703
0.744

Googlenet Densenet VGG-16BN
0.989
0.982
0.981
0.601
0.630
0.592
0.711
0.728
0.734

EfficientNet-B0
0.987
0.586
0.720

Transferability. In this experiment, the attacker generates the noised trigger based on
Resnet18, while the victims use five other model architectures (VGG [55], EfficientNet [76],
Googlenet [77], Densenet [78], and Resnet34) to perform training on the ImageNet10 dataset,
with a poison ratio of 2%. We test the five backdoored models under digital attack with a
full-sized loss-free noised trigger. The results are shown in Table 19.
We observe high transferable rates of our proposed attack model throughout all the five
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architectures with over 98% success rates. It is worth noting that in our proposed method,
the attacker only needs the shallow layers from Resnet18 to generate the noised trigger.
Previous studies [79, 80] have shown that the shallow layers learn low level features (such as
short line, curves, etc.) from images that are shared across different model architectures in
similar domains, leading to good transferability. Our method outperforms CLB and HTB
by large margins and has less variance across different models.
4.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has discovered a newfound clean label attack, named Invisible Poison, which
can stealthily and aggressively plant a backdoor in neural netork (NN) models. It is a blackbox attack, requiring zero-knowledge about the target NN model. Moreover, the “invisible
poison” is stealthy since the triggers are hidden as noise and invisible to human, but at
the same time remain significant in NN model’s feature space and thus highly effective to
poison training data. The Invisible Poison attack has been implemented in PyTorch and
fully tested on multiple benchmark datasets including MNIST, Cifar10, and ImageNet10, as
well as different NN architectures. Experimental results have shown that a backdoor can be
effectively planted with a very small amount of poisoned data, e.g., achieving an average of
over 97% attack success rate with as low as only 1% of training data poisoned in the loss-free
digital attack scenario. In physical attack with lossy images, an adversarial trigger in a size
of merely 1% of the original image can activate the backdoor with a success rate of over 80%
under 1% poison ratio.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation first discusses the challenges and current works of security enhancement
of the DL-based smartphone system. It also introduces the three aspects of my research: (1)
Exploring mobile side-channel vulnerabilities. (2) Building side-channel defence mechanisms.
(3) Exploring vulnerabilities of deep learning techniques and develop countermeasures.
Chapter 2 discusses the work of discovering a new mobile side-channel attack, where the
attacker can sniff mobile Apps by analyzing magnetometer or orientation data along with
motion sensor data using deep learning techniques. It has been demonstrated on both iPhone
7 Plus and Samsung Galaxy 7. The experiments have shown that its accuracy is as high as
98%. It has further proposed a noise injection scheme to mitigate such attacks effectively.
Chapter 3 discusses Capsjack, a study to detect malicious cryptocurrency mining activities by using the latest CapsNet technology. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
work to introduce CapsNet to the field of malware detection. It is particularly useful to
detect malicious miners under multitasking environments where multiple applications run
simultaneously. Built upon the success of the CapsNet-based approach, I have further developed a two-layer classification system, which can effectively transform a pre-trained model to
detect miners on new devices. This is intrinsically important to achieve practical usability,
given the wide variety of devices used by victims. The work has delivered a well-engineered
prototype. The experiments have revealed valuable empirical insights into the design space
and the application of CapsNet for detecting malicious mining activities. Experimental data
have shown the appealing performance of CapJack, with a detection rate of as high as 87%
instantly and 99% within a window of 11 seconds.
As the deep neural network plays as an essential role in the modern smartphone system,
its robustness becomes crucial. To this end, Chapter 4 discusses Invisible Poison, a newfound
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clean label attack, which can stealthily and aggressively plant a backdoor in NN models. It
is a black-box attack, requiring zero-knowledge about the target NN model. Moreover, the
“invisible poison” is stealthy since the triggers are hidden as noise and invisible to humans,
but at the same time significantly amplified in the NN model’s feature space and thus highly
effective to poison training data.
It is unrealistic for me to exhaust all the vulnerabilities, but I have developed and demonstrated a systematical methodology of discovering possible vulnerabilities and developing
countermeasures on the DL-based smartphone system.
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